Alone Together

Being a podcaster is a bit embarrassing. It’s much easier than writing (my intended career) but much better paid. The term itself is dweeby — sounding at once outdated and newfangled — and impossible to say unsheepishly. I think every podcaster who is not too stupid or full of himself to notice (pace Janet Malcolm) knows that what he does is a benign grift, not sordid enough to inspire shame or attract real scorn, but not worthy nor challenging enough to be a vocation. We are brothers and sisters in blameless mediocrity; we evince a dopey ennui. 

Last year, there was a lot of talk about whether podcasts won the election for Donald Trump and whether chat shows hosted by people who’d given themselves brain injuries from blood sport or overusing Twitter were the future of politics. Democrats yearned for “their own Joe Rogan,” someone to win back the coveted “podcast vote.” (Now that Rogan and several of his “bro-podcast” peers have turned on Trump, the urgency has dissipated.)

Of course, there was no podcast vote. The form is too various to have one ideological bias. But the fleeting liberal anguish over Rogan registered something real. Successful podcasts do seem to have one thing in common: each creates its own public, an aesthetic and cultural tribe. My girlfriend makes fun of me because whenever we meet someone in the wild who is a fan of my show, they’re always the same kind of person: gentle, unassuming, sincere, in or out of grad school, often religious or “searching,” and usually better informed about the topic of my show than I am. 

Likewise, when I meet a fellow fan of my favorite podcast, “Hollywood Handbook,” they are almost always outwardly diffident, but eager to riff — shy people desperate for someone to find out how funny they are. Listeners to “Chapo Trap House” are so kindred in their sensibilities, a new term was summoned to describe their bloc: the dirtbag left. “Chapo” fans were probably demographically alike before they became listeners, but it was the show — by modeling that one could be left-wing without being supercilious or humorless, and that hating Republicans shouldn’t stop you from hating Democrats — that made them into dirtbag leftists. 

Even Rogan, whose audience (an estimated eleven million listeners per episode) is obviously too large to be homogenous, cultivates a type. In my experience, Rogan’s fans resemble Joe Rogan. They are curious, good-natured, politically promiscuous, and compelled equally by masculinity and conspiracy: high T (testosterone) and low G (guile).

Why should podcasts generate such uniform publics? For one, it’s nearly impossible to listen consistently to a podcast whose hosts you dislike, or to enjoy a show ironically or with contempt; a podcast is too intimate and too easy to turn off. If I listen to a new show out of morbid curiosity — or for work — I will inevitably either bounce off quickly, or else find myself becoming endeared to the voices in my head. Disquietingly, the latter happened to me while working on a piece about the odious pipsqueak antisemite Nick Fuentes; I was charmed by him. I only stopped listening because the content was repellent enough to rouse me, every so often, from mindlessly enjoying his affect.

Podcasts are simply not compatible with friction. They are intended — like so much content these days — to lubricate the passage of time. And yet they involve what the philosopher Marshall McLuhan called “empathic involvement.” We are half-listening but emotionally enveloped, forming warm, subrational bonds with our hosts and their imagined publics; the podcast listener “bathes,” to borrow McLuhan’s phrase, “in the emotions of post-literacy.” There is something vaguely amniotic about the whole experience of listening to a podcast: the light pressure and muted seclusion of noise cancellation or car-stereo surround sound, the comforting, overloud sound of familiar voices. It’s no wonder podcasters earn the trust of our listeners so easily: we’re addressing them inside the womb!

There’s a vogue for describing the digital age as a whole as “post-literate.” Surely that is an overstatement. (Look at you, for example, reading a literary magazine!) But for some podcasters, the theories of McLuhan and his former student Walter J. Ong have an obvious attraction. (For us, illiteracy is an occupational hazard.) Ong thought the displacement of writing by talking and talk-like writing — the closing of what some call, evocatively, “the Gutenberg Parenthesis” — had regenerated some of the cognitive conditions of ancient “tribal” societies, with their attendant fixations on sound, mnemonics, agonism, kinship, status competition, and relationships over logical argument (i.e., it matters more who says something than what is said). Thus, as “TrueAnon” cohost Brace Belden wrote last October of our shared craft, “Repetition, conversational language, humor, and emotion are significantly more important than actually saying anything interesting.”

Of course, the modern world has not returned to a pre-Gutenberg state. Our dismal expressive present resembles a peculiar synthesis of spoken and textual cultures, reacquiring certain features of pre-literate life without shedding the individualism, acquisitiveness, and introversion characteristic of the print era. We get tribe without community, emotional cathexis without sociality, balladeers without poetry. We’re alone together. Podcasts are a neat synecdoche for this contradiction: an unlovely surrogate form of connectivity, which we experience in solitude.

A Post-Political Fantasy

“To the extent that the Academe remembers its ancient origins, it must know that it was founded by the polis’s most determined and most influential opponent,” Hannah Arendt wrote, referring to Plato, in “Truth and Politics.” Originally appearing in the pages of The New Yorker in 1967, the essay was perhaps one of the most-assigned texts in university classrooms at the height of liberal panic over the so-called post-truth age. 

“Truth and Politics” was featured in a 2020 Harvard Kennedy School course held in an overflowing auditorium — the largest class I ever worked for as a teaching assistant. The syllabus promised to impart an understanding of how ignorance is manufactured in the public sphere. “You’ll be asked to consider what sort of policies are justified in keeping the public ignorant and which ones aren’t,” the instructor wrote. “When is it permissible for the government to keep secrets from us? Here is also where you will learn about forms of public ignorance that arise from prejudice and ideology.” Students were asked to consider whether we would be better off in an epistocracy ruled by the trustworthy knowers instead of a democracy ruled by the unruly demos

Hannah Arendt did not share Plato’s dream that the university should be a training ground for rulers who would eventually seize power and vanquish the threat of democracy. Against Plato’s belief that philosopher kings could justly rule alone through rational deliberation, Arendt defended an “enlarged mentality” that arose from contributions from a diversity of perspectives. She believed that those perspectives could be grounded in a shared reality, a “common world” established by the university along with the media and the judiciary. Arendt’s idea of the university was in a sense a post-political fantasy. In her view, “truthtellers” stood apart from the realm of power and the struggle over resources, just as for Habermas the rational deliberator existed outside the reach of state control and corporate interest. 

Since the time of the Manhattan Project, as Erik Baker has convincingly argued, American academia has accepted its role as an ideological state apparatus in the U.S. imperial project: universities are increasingly dependent on Department of Defense funding, produce knowledge deployed in wars of conquest and counterinsurgency, and police student and faculty criticism of this militarized mission. Yet, in the Harvard Kennedy School class, we pretended that we could sit around discussing issues that concern the public with unclouded judgment — even as we worked within an institution that consistently reproduces existing power structures, furnishing the ruling elite with C.V.s that catapult them straight to the White House and the Department of State. In the past few years, universities have repeatedly demonstrated that they were ready to surrender any emancipatory element, from DEI to freedom of association, when faced with political (and financial) pressure. 

Fashioning themselves as refuges of truth in line with Arendt’s vision, educational institutions have weaponized their supposed neutrality against calls for justice and freedom from within. Campus conflicts over the last decade — from anti-sexual violence campaigns to union drives to Palestine encampments — have shown that universities’ doctrine of neutrality functions as a vehicle for disciplinary power. In May 2024, after months of clamping down on student encampments and all forms of pro-Palestine activism, universities convened task forces to draft restrictions on speech and organization, carefully wordsmithing the resulting restrictions as measures to protect neutrality. “The University and its leaders should not issue official statements about public matters that do not directly impact the University’s core function as an academic institution,” decreed Harvard University, defining that function as “seeking truth through open inquiry, debate, and the careful weighing of evidence.” As the university went on the defensive, treating political claims as improper speech, private grievance, or acts of disorder, it also opened up an opportunity to reclaim the university for the demos

Campus politics must be credited with the ignition of what Jacques Rancière called subjectification, a process that defines someone as a subject of wrong and then allows the wronged to articulate a demand. It creates, as Rancière says, “not a place for a dialogue or a search for a consensus in a Habermasian fashion,” but rather a stage “for the handling of a wrong and the demonstration of equality.” In 2018, eighteen women demanded institutional accountability after being harassed by Professor Jorge Domínguez at Harvard. In 2024, Palestine Legal recorded over a thousand requests for protection against silencing of pro-Palestine speech at universities. In both cases, individuals, as part of movements, argued that they were being denied equal standing in their communities. 

The ideal of the university as existing outside politics is morally bankrupt. We can no longer pretend we study on Arendt’s campus, and all the better for it. We each have to lay a partisan claim to the university and build power to seize its operations in the service of public interest. 

Last semester it was my turn to teach “Truth and Politics.” In a smaller course at the University of Pennsylvania, a handful of students and I parsed the liberal fantasy of doing politics without politics in the university and beyond, interrogating ideals of deliberative democracy and public reason. The course ended with Simone Weil’s On the Abolition of All Political Parties — a text that perturbed nearly all my students with its distaste for collective organization and characterization of partisanship as ignorance. The ridiculousness of the neutrality doctrine peeked behind Weil’s exaggerated prose (“It is when we desire truth with an empty soul…that we receive the light”) and reflected off the buildings surrounding us, each of which was emblazoned with the name of a corporation.