Bringing It Back to Baldwin

With Eddie Glaude Jr.’s Begin Again: James Baldwin’s America and its Urgent Lessons for Our Own, the recent surplus of James Baldwin features has grown another monograph larger. Begin Again quickly climbed bestseller lists, earning a number of glowing reviews hardly surprising, given that, over these past few years, Baldwin has certainly been back in vogue. This summer, we may have reached peak Baldwin: Instagram was rife with the author’s quotations, and his books topped “anti-racist reading lists.” 

Ta-Nehisi Coates is often credited with kickstarting the Baldwin revival. His 2015 bestselling epistolary memoir, Between the World and Me, mimicked the structure of the popular essay that comprises half of Baldwin’s The Fire Next Time (1963). In an open letter to his nephew, Baldwin sounds off on the apocalyptic consequences of American racism, while Coates reflects on the same ever-present force in an extended letter to his son. While much distinguishes Baldwin’s writing from Coates’, both brandish a mode of collective address, inhabiting the role of native informant and laying bare the inner life of racialized communities. Ultimately, both books provide pseudo-psychologized accounts of interpersonal race relations: Baldwin boils Black consciousness down to a state of fury while Coates diagnoses racists as “people who believe they are white.” Baldwin introduced the American reading public to these formulae, and Coates has helped ensure that we will stick to them. 

Within the academy, we’ve seen an outpouring of Baldwin publications including James Baldwin and the Queer Imagination (2014), The Fire This Time: A New Generation Speaks About Race (2017), and James Baldwin in Context (2019). The Baldwin resurgence has extended to movie theaters and streaming services as well. In 2016, Baldwin’s unpublished Remember This House was delivered to contemporary audiences in the form of I Am Not Your Negro. Two years later, Barry Jenkins’s film adaptation of the Baldwin novel If Beale Street Could Talk opened to sold-out theaters. Most recently, Baldwin appeared on the first season of HBO’s Lovecraft Country: his voice emanates from the radio as the show’s central Black characters drive across the Midwest. Set during the Jim Crow era, the characters encounter segregated lunch counters, unfettered racists at gas stations, and an unemployment line composed entirely of African Americans. Listening to Baldwin restate and respond to the question “does the inequality suffered by African Americans hinder the American Dream?” brings the show’s sinister portrait of malt shop America into sharp relief. 

What is it about Baldwin’s decades-old analysis that continues to resonate so thoroughly in the post-Obama period? Baldwin placed two foundational concepts at the heart of American racial inequality: a crisis of white racial identity and moral depravity on a national scale. This framework still guides public conversation about America’s past and future as it relates to race, surfacing in electoral candidates’ mantras about the “soul of the nation” and the self-help guides (think Ibram X. Kendi’s How to be an Antiracist and Robin DiAngelo’s White Fragility) that have headlined post-protest reading lists. Time and again, the focus on recalibrating the nation’s moral compass overshadows recognition of racial justice as a self-evident good.

An expansive historical chasm separates us from Baldwin, but his frustrated nationalism still informs a liberal imaginary now allergic to historical difference. No one has made this clearer than Coates, whose mourning and exhaustion comes as a result of his insistence on aligning contemporary racial inequality with a homogenous history of the changing same. From “The Case for Reparations” (2014) to We Were Eight Years in Power (2017), Coates repeatedly frames the racial animus that followed the Obama presidency as the zenith of centuries of racial discrimination, the tribal nature of which he treats as inevitable. His investment in the political promise of Black American cultural institutions, along with his reparations arguments, have buoyed his quasi-Black nationalist nostalgia. Despite his express concessions to the inevitability of white supremacy in the U.S., Coates has led a wave of public scholarship that chases contemporary racial justice by reminding America of its racist past.

The New York Times’s 1619 Project followed Coates’s lead, seeking to reconfigure the idea of America by coming to terms with its origins in the Atlantic slave trade. As its title suggests, 1619’s overarching conceit is the unthinkability of any idea of America that fails to foreground its enslaved beginnings in Jamestown, Virginia. Combining journalism, poetry, and popular history, it highlights the role of American slavery in shaping contemporary politics, culture, and everyday life, with implications visible to us in American sugar consumption, traffic in Atlanta, and the record-shattering reception of Lil Nas X. By documenting the numerous violations of the framers’ democratic social contract, 1619 attempts to set the record straight about America’s refusal to make good on its founding ideals. It purports to offer a more truthful U.S. history as a means of redeeming the nation though its accuracy is up for contentious debate among academic historians.

The immediate relevance of this contentious history serves the urgency of our present politics. Countering the Trumpian campaign promises to restore the United States to its former glory, 1619 lays out the historical realities that put this perverse patriotism to shame. But, oddly, it shares a similar investment in the injury to our sacred national ideals. Its commitment to racial justice is hampered by a cruel optimism about what a rightfully realized idea of America could be. 

 

The best liberal intentions have a long history of materializing in the form of redemptive projects like 1619’s. In fact, several historians have traced the absorption of anti-racism by romantic nationalism to the early years of the Cold War. After sponsoring the reconstruction of Western Europe after World War II, the U.S. aimed to further expand its ideological reach. It needed to beat back the Soviet influence that had crept into Central and Eastern Europe and centered the hypocrisy of American racism in its propaganda campaigns. Swedish sociologist Gunnar Myrdal had telegraphed the racial implications of the U.S./Soviet conflict before it even began. With philanthropic help from the Carnegie Corporation, his study An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy (1944) had framed racial inequality as the final obstacle to clear in the American ascent to geopolitical hegemony. In response, American state power took a number of measures to “address” widespread systemic racism (such as the Truman administration’s short-lived Committee on Civil Rights, 1946-1947), enacting a program of gestural anti-racism in order to legitimate its claims to global leadership.

The backstory to Myrdal’s sociological project typifies the tragedy of how we’ve come to talk about race and nation. A pioneer in sociological study, W.E.B. Du Bois had secured several institutional endorsements for his proposed Encyclopedia of the Negro over the course of the 1930s. Contrary to the ideals of gradual racial progress advanced by his institutionally supported peers, Du Bois intended to account for the material violences of race and capitalism in America and throughout the modern world. Carnegie Corporation president Frederick Keppel alleged that an “emotional factor” had compromised both Black and white American analysts, and organizations including the Rockefeller Foundation and General Education Board rescinded their support for the project. The Carnegie Corporation divested resources designated for Du Bois, reallocating them instead to Myrdal on the assumption that the Swedish native would be guaranteed-objective. Myrdal identified African American cultural pathology and distorted family life as obstacles to assimilation, which he painted as the ultimate answer to the Negro Problem. Following Myrdal’s work, philanthropic funds invested in furthering the multi-disciplinary study of race. Under the guises of multiculturalism and diversity, the institutional preoccupation with racial and national identity would persist for decades to come. 

The power of these philanthropic foundations subsumed literary and academic worlds alike. As early as the 1930s, the Rosenwald and Rockefeller funds had cultivated a coterie of Black writers, intellectuals, and social scientists that the State Department could marshal in the promotion of its race relations programs. They supported Black social scientists Ralph Bunche and E. Franklin Frazier, along with writers such as Zora Neale Hurston, James Weldon Johnson, and Chester Himes. Yet by 1948, Black intellectuals could no longer depend on these philanthropic funds. And in response to the prosecutions that came with the Cold War’s second Red Scare, magazines like The New Leader, Commentary, and Partisan Review severed ties with many communist-affiliated writers en route to rebranding themselves as liberal-centrist publications. 

Baldwin entered a literary scene heretofore dominated by the protest novel and the philanthropic institutions that sponsored it, the sociology departments that studied it, and the Black writers who produced it. Though Baldwin recognized the intended utility of what he regarded as social justice “tracts,” he found that they set a low bar for literary form, compromising the artistic integrity of the Western novel. Even in his essays, Baldwin imitated James Joyce, Henry James, and other Anglophone idols throughout the late 1940s and 1950s, most notably by adopting Emerson’s “national we” in essays such as “Strangers in the Village” (1953) and “The Discovery of What it Means to Be American” (1959). In “Everybody’s Protest Novel,” the 1949 essay that launched Baldwin to fame, he denounced the genealogy of social realism that had begun with Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin (1852) and culminated in Richard Wright’s Native Son (1940). Where protest writers took to the novel to level their anti-racist social critiques, Baldwin mobilized memoir to diagnose the causes and consequences of American racism. By synthesizing Myrdal-inspired sociological paradigms with conventional literary forms, Baldwin revolutionized the art of the essay.

Baldwin’s achievements, though, far exceeded categorical revisions on the relationship of race to literature. His non-academic essays made the study of race available to audiences outside the academy, inviting casual readers for better or worse to keep up with rapidly evolving conceptions of race to which Baldwin himself was a key contributor. Regarded as an unrivaled public intellectual for much of his career, it wasn’t until the decline of the Civil Rights Movement and the commercialization of Black Power in the 1970s that Baldwin fell out of favor in the public eye. 

Though he was indebted to New York’s liberal magazines for his early success, Baldwin refused to publish with them by the 1960s. In his late writing he adopted the fiery tone of his Black nationalist critics, many of whom had grown exhausted with Baldwin’s sentimentalism and Martin Luther King Jr.’s commitment to nonviolence. After coming to fame as an opponent of protest fiction, Baldwin made an about-face with the publication of Tell Me How the Train’s Been Gone in 1968. The least successful novel of his career met all the criteria for “propaganda fiction,” according to its early reviews. And by many accounts, it accomplished little outside of parroting the radical politics of the Black Arts and Black Power movements. Baldwin persisted in articulating his newfound radicalism in the novels If Beale Street Could Talk (1974) and Just Above My Head (1979), but as far as Black liberation movements were concerned, his transformation seemed unfashionably late

 

Decades after his death in 1987, Baldwin’s sermonic anti-racism is now in unprecedented demand. As Baldwin the radical convert has been embraced by mainstream media, his initially strained relationships with social movements and his conformity to institutional initiatives have been largely forgotten. To a significant share of committed anti-racists and well-intentioned allies, it’s Baldwin who personifies what feels like a once-in-a-lifetime movement. The echoes of post-Civil Rights Black nationalism that emanate from his late essays square well with this summer’s widespread sense that revolution was underway.

For this reason, it is hardly a shock that Eddie Glaude, chair of Princeton’s Department of African American Studies, confronts the current crisis by turning his readers to the instructive merits of Baldwin’s preacherly admonitions and insistence on spiritual renewal. The enduring appeal that Glaude finds in Baldwin’s anti-racist texts lies in their penchant for elucidating the inner workings of white racial prejudice and for pointing the way for the Black patriots who must endure. Absent from this uncritical invocation of Baldwin in Begin Again are the ideological shifts that shaped Baldwin’s writing from one decade to the next. Neglecting the complexities of Baldwin’s relationships to social movements and institutional power, Glaude imagines a consistent Baldwin whose steady moral vision is at once unique within his own social milieu and illuminating for ours. This allows Glaude to conveniently shore up his own patriotic moralism with Baldwin’s ostensibly prescient national critique. Baldwin wrote to the violent events of the 1960s, the end of the welfare state in the 1970s, and the austerity measures taken by the Reagan administration during the 1980s, all of which Glaude finds apt for the “aftertimes” marked by the election of Donald Trump. 

Glaude takes the term “aftertimes” from Democratic Vistas (1871), Walt Whitman’s attempt to grapple with the social unrest that had obstructed the federal project of Reconstruction. He uses it to name white Americans’ resistance to social change following high points of anti-racist struggle, clarifying that he means something different from “backlash” or racial reaction. “In critical moments of transition, when it seems as if old ways of living and established norms are fading,” Glaude writes, “deep-seated fears emerge over loss of standing and privilege.” Put this way, “aftertimes” describes an atmosphere of racist counterrevolution, whereby white Americans cling to the myth of their supremacy in the moments in which it appears most threatened. 

Glaude’s sleight of hand amounts to an outright reduction of America’s current democratic crisis to a problem of race alone, and he uses Baldwin to corroborate this conceptual move. Throughout, he offers stunningly definitive (and largely uncritical) claims about what Baldwin “knew” or “understood,” chief among them: “Sure, policy mattered. Power mattered. But in the end, for Jimmy what kind of human beings we aspired to be mattered more.” Apart from the presumption of deducing Baldwin’s inner life from his published essays, Glaude’s musings on the morality and identity of the nation preclude all discussion of economic stressors, labor relations, and demographic shifts. His meager effort to ground these claims in historical materialism results in the lumping of slavery, Jim Crow, lynching, police killings, prisons, Black ghettos, and failed schools into a continuous “pile of American shit.” Here, he draws on Baldwin again in order to defend the view that these ills have been perpetuated by America’s unwillingness to reckon with “who we are.” 

Glaude’s recovery of Baldwin’s moralism also raises the stakes of the upcoming 2020 election. He frames the imperative to remove Trump from office as America’s opportunity to rectify a history of racist ills and chart a new racially just course. But this endeavor is complicated by the way Glaude positions electoral politics as secondary to moral aptitude and individual character. He writes, “changing laws or putting our faith in politicians to do the right thing are not enough [sic]. We have to rid ourselves, once and for all, of this belief that white people matter more than others, or we’re doomed to repeat the cycles of our ugly history over and over again.” At the same time that Glaude fixates on what he calls “the lie” of white supremacy, he invokes Baldwin’s prophetic promise that the racial regime in America can’t continue. With no clear picture of what an impending reckoning would look like, Glaude doubles down on Baldwin’s prediction that there will be hell to pay if our nation doesn’t atone for its racial sins. This eschatological vision marks the inadequacy of Glaude’s moral framework, leaving open the question: if the white supremacist fervor characteristic of the Trump universe has been routinely recycled since the Civil War, what does it mean to say that the nation’s racial sins will eventually catch up with it? 

Yet Glaude is committed to the logical limitations of his address. He claims that America is in need of moral recovery and self-remaking, yet he concedes the deplorability of the white Americans who’ve chosen a distorted patriotism over economic justice and human rights. To frame this voting bloc’s frustration as anything other than racial nationalism would be to deny its purchase on a pugnacious pillar of the electorate. Following his claim that Baldwin finally learned that it’s up to racists to free themselves from the myths of their own supremacy, Glaude insists that we cease our attempts to sympathize with Trump voters who’ve felt increasingly left behind. “We cannot give in to these people,” Glaude declares, offering no clarification as to whom exactly he is asking to acknowledge the fundamental disregard for Black lives.  

As far as his readership is concerned, Glaude insists that we forge communities based not on differences of identity but on bonds of love. Glaude wants his readers to come to terms with something like an ugly truth about America so as to salvage the democratic principles that have been undermined by anti-Black racism. This requires idealizing Baldwin as a seer whose moral guidance we should heed in order to realize a more racially just national future. But in the end, Glaude’s preachiness amounts to fervent restatements of the obvious (“the idea of America is in deep trouble”), and he struggles to answer the question of exactly how Baldwin’s meditations pertain to the present moment. He minimizes the particularities of our contemporary politics by likening them to as many events from Baldwin’s lifetime as possible, casting serious doubts onto the viability of long-term social change. 

What’s actually instructive about the life and times of James Baldwin is how his work lived largely in literary circles and in lecture halls. His Lovecraft Country cameo excerpts a debate with William F. Buckley at Cambridge University in 1965, one of many televised performances that Baldwin shared with actors Marlon Brando and Sydney Portier and entertainers such as Harry Belafonte and Dick Gregory. Throughout the popular part of his career, Baldwin’s writing served a liberal establishment that stifled radical demands on institutions with abstract anti-racism and narratives of interpersonal racial progress. The striking similarity between the high point of Baldwin’s career and the moment of his resurgence is that racial justice is negotiated far too frequently on these terms. Liberal common sense demands an anti-racism aimed at fortifying Black identities and rehabilitating racist individuals, and it’s the promotion of these projects to which Baldwin has now so often been consigned. It is possible to cherish Baldwin as a canonical American writer while remaining critical of the liberal discourses to which he contributed. It’s Baldwin as a creature of these historically specific contexts from whom we have so much to learn.

“Different Experiences with the Data”

I thought learning about DC’s Covid-19 response would help me regain the sense of control I lost in March. I’d been inside for three months, court closures had made my day job as a paralegal largely irrelevant, and DC’s Covid-19 dashboard updated daily around 10:30 AM. I started waiting in bed every morning until the latest infections and deaths were posted, in some version of the strategy people use to combat a fear of flying: stay awake for the entire flight, carefully watching the wing to ensure the plane doesn’t crash. 

My coping mechanism worked well enough until June 22, when Mayor Muriel Bowser announced that the District would enter its second phase of reopening. The problem was, I knew DC had not met the metrics to do so. I had proof Bowser manipulated Covid-19 data, and local reporters used my frantically tweeted research to report on the discrepancy between DC’s real numbers and its publicly touted progress. The city went ahead and reopened anyway. 

The facile explanation for DC’s data manipulation is widely accepted on the left: Bowser rushed reopening because she prioritized business owners over vulnerable residents, the economy over human life. This line of thinking is broadly true, but the driving force behind rushed reopenings across the country is more complicated. No one was prepared for the financial impact of Covid-19, and states had only two options to avoid massive budget shortfalls: federal aid, or consumer spending. Since the former was unlikely to materialize, states needed to jumpstart the latter. Pulling back the curtain on the inadequate state budget system was unlikely to motivate thirty-somethings to go back to bars and restaurants. But making reopening seem safe (or never shutting down in the first place) was an easy way to keep people spending, business interests happy, and increasingly vital social services funded. 

Eight months into the pandemic, it’s obvious that this strategy failed to stop the spread of Covid-19. States are now only aiming to contain the inevitable wave of infections as cities reopen, the weather turns colder, and flu season starts. Without significant federal support, they will fail again.

 

By March 16, forty-eight states and DC had issued half-hearted state-of-emergency declarations — but these had little effect on transmission of the virus, which had already been spreading across the country, undetected, for over a month. As the first wave of deadly outbreaks hit, states instituted comically asynchronous stay-at-home orders. While Californians were told to remain inside starting on March 19, their neighbors in Arizona and Nevada were free to continue on as normal until March 31. Philadelphia issued a citywide order on March 22, but Pennsylvania’s state order didn’t take effect until April 1. Of the forty-five states that ultimately issued stay-at-home orders, only eight shut down on the same day as a neighboring state: Oregon and Washington, Michigan and Indiana, Maryland and Virginia, and Georgia and Florida. Absent unified orders and enforcement, residents could easily evade hometown restrictions by crossing a border. Philly residents were driving to Delaware for booze long before Covid-19 closed Pennsylvania’s state-run liquor stores, and they continued to do so until state troopers started enforcing the Delaware Governor’s order in April.

Recent talk of “reopening” implies that the United States was shut down for a significant period of time, but most states lifted at least some restrictions within 40 days. In DC, less than a month after her stay-at-home order, Bowser convened the ReOpen DC Advisory Group. Led by Obama-era Ambassador Susan Rice and Bush-era DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff, every member was handpicked by Bowser, seemingly on the basis of personal loyalty. Chertoff’s primary experience with national emergencies was botching the federal response to Hurricane Katrina. Only two restaurateurs (celebrity chef José Andrés and woke entrepreneur Andy Shallal) were selected for the committee responsible for restaurants and food retailers; charter school advocates were on the education committee, but public school teachers and union representatives were not. Other members included an assortment of District developers and lobbyists, plus Bowser’s older brother Marvin. 

The advisory group surveyed more than 17,000 District residents, held focus groups, and hosted a town hall before issuing a plan for which kinds of venues could reopen early (restaurant patios, tennis courts) and which should stay closed until the virus was under control (bars, communal pools). Their recommendations laid out how DC should reopen, but said little about when to do so, beyond asking city officials to consider issuing “clear communication regarding gating criteria for reopening and pulling back.” After the group’s plan was released, DC cut its previously-announced list of 11 reopening metrics down to six; Bowser repeatedly denied that the removed criteria had ever been under consideration.

One of the surviving metrics was the CDC-recommended 14-day decline in recorded cases. The number of new cases indicates how far the virus has spread in an area, and foreshadows how many hospitalizations and deaths will occur in the following weeks. The benchmark appeared in state reopening plans but was difficult to achieve in the spring, when restrictions had only been implemented a month or two prior. Cases kept rising and, by May, only a few states had experienced close to a 14-day decline. Most that hadn’t met the goal quietly abandoned it, but DC had a better solution: redefining it. DC’s Health Department clarified that it was now looking for a 14-day decline in “community spread” — excluding infections in “congregate settings” like jails, shelters, and nursing homes. DC officials presented the change as a routine improvement in data reporting. This metric was more accurate, DC Health claimed, as it charted the number of infectious people out and about on a particular date rather than the total number of positive test results. 

Despite the sharp increase in daily number of new infections, DC kept reporting a decline in community spread. This was because the metric tracked infectious people by graphing when their symptoms began; the date of symptom onset was determined by interviews conducted days (or weeks) after a positive test result came in. The delay rendered the metric absurdly volatile: on July 14, DC reported only 24 infectious people. By July 20, DC had raised that estimate for the same days to 62. The most recent seven-to-nine days of community spread data always displayed a decline, not because cases were actually decreasing but because DC hadn’t completed the contact tracing necessary to confirm cases were going up. By June 19, an undeterred Bowser announced that DC had met its goal of fourteen days of decline in community spread, and would be ready for the next stage of reopening three days later. The next day, a new spike was reported, which should have set the count back three days. But the data was quickly deleted from the public dashboard; a hastily cropped screenshot I’d tweeted is the only record, to my knowledge, that it had been posted at all. 

Rachel Sadon of DCist spotted the deletion when comparing my tweet to the dashboard, but Bowser’s office refused to explain what happened. When asked about the deleted data at a press conference on June 22, Bowser almost claimed nothing had been removed. “Nothing was re-” she began, before correcting herself: “I don’t know what you’re referring to as being removed.” She confirmed there had been a spike but claimed reopening did not need to be delayed because DC had already met the metric. This was untrue. “We always know we can have different experiences with the data,” she said. Cases in DC doubled three weeks after reopening.

The infamous screenshot, courtesy of Allison Hrabar

 

I will admit that this is the point where I lost my mind. I submitted a FOIA request to DC Health asking for any written communication about data removal; a FOIA officer told me that the health department has no control over what is posted on the dashboard and suggested I ask the Mayor’s office. Over the course of multiple Saturdays, I crafted an Excel chart to track weekly changes in community spread. When I casually mentioned Covid-19 on a Zoom call with friends, there were audible groans and an impression of me talking about “the charts.” I developed an all-encompassing hunger for validation, rattling off statistics whenever someone mentioned the mayor, the virus, or the concept of socializing.

Despite my best efforts, inaccurate and misleading Covid-19 data is a nationwide problem. Virginia, Vermont, and Texas artificially inflated their testing capacity prior to reopening by combining the count of viral tests (the swab-up-your-nose variety) with the less-reliable antibody blood tests. Nevada dismissed an increase in cases as a side effect of expanded testing and lab delays in making its case for reopening casinos in May; it had its highest single-day infection growth within two-and-a-half weeks. Georgia, a deep-red state, adopted a community spread metric identical to DC’s. While DC’s received little media attention, Georgia’s was accurately flagged as an attempt to make the state appear as if it had moved past the peak of cases. 

Still, DC’s deletion of unfavorable data was extreme. While some of the pressure on Bowser to shut down late and reopen early came from businesses hoping to stay afloat, DC’s lack of autonomy over its budget was a significant factor. Unlike the federal government, DC cannot issue debt and spend its way out of a crisis. Unlike states, DC must have its budget approved by Congress and the President. Congress can even dictate how we spend our reserves or generate revenue; when DC residents voted to legalize marijuana, Congress forbade taxing its sale. Unable to issue debt, tap into obvious new income sources, or even access the full CARES Act money that states received, DC could not give businesses and suddenly out-of-work residents the support they needed to get through a lengthy shutdown. Even though restaurants remained fully open until last call at brunch on March 15, DC was already projecting a $1.5 billion revenue shortfall by April.

States have slightly more control over the details of their budget than the District does, but it’s unlikely any of them could have met the level of spending required to mitigate shutdown losses without significant federal assistance. California is currently facing a $54 billion deficit, and already has relied on $10 billion in federal aid. $14 billion in additional federal aid is needed to prevent further budget cuts. In DC, the chief financial officer is assuming that at least some additional federal assistance will be approved, because the alternative would be “allowing the economy to go into an even deeper recession.” But it’s unlikely his optimism will pay off, as Trump continues to abruptly call off and restart stimulus negotiations. Trump “personally came up with the strategy of blaming the states,” according to Max Kennedy, Jr., who worked on the federal Covid-19 task force. The Trump administration abdicated leadership early on, allowing states to battle it out over scarce PPE and putting severe limitations on how they could use the aid they did receive. Faced with massive revenue shortfalls, states chose to accept the small gains of a hurried reopening rather than fighting for the federal resources necessary to bail out workers and business owners. 

If the pandemic had lasted only a month or two, bargaining for more death in exchange for more revenue might have worked. Stay-at-home orders had a dramatic impact on local economies: the US had an average five percent decline in GDP in the first quarter of 2020, but the economies of states that never issued stay-at-home orders were hit less hard. North Dakota, South Dakota, and Nebraska only saw declines of 1.3-2.6 percent; Iowa and Oklahoma kept their declines under four percent. Arkansas’s five percent decline was the largest among the stay-at-home holdouts but on par with declines in the rest of the country. The obvious trade-off for a relatively better GDP is a significantly worse infection rate: North Dakota and South Dakota have the highest rates of Covid in the country. Iowa, Arkansas, Oklahoma, and Nebraska all appear in the top ten.

States that shut down saved lives, but they will be forced to make strict budget cuts in 2021 and beyond. Take Utah, which collects more than $1 billion in revenue from travel and tourist spending each year. Visits to national and state parks nosedived as the country shut down. Every convention booked for 2020 in Salt Lake City was cancelled over the course of one week in March. 65,000 Utah hospitality workers were laid off in April. Salt Lake City alone lost $221,104,425 in hotel room bookings, according to a deck sent to me by an industry professional. Although the state has partially reopened, Salt Lake will be lucky if a single convention is held in the first half of 2021. Contracts are not being signed, and at least one group scheduled for October 2021 has already cancelled. 

It’s difficult to assemble state-level revenue data if you don’t, say, know someone who works in the hospitality industry in Utah. Forty-nine states and DC have released data about their budget shortfalls, but none are open about the reasons we can’t roll back reopening in the wake of significant case spikes. Stay-at-home orders were effective at slowing the spread of the virus not only because of the legal force they carried, but also because, it turns out, people still take cues from government and community leaders. In a recent update on DC’s finances, Bowser stressed that progress on DC’s reopening metrics would be the key to making sure workers and consumers felt “confident” returning to normal. Actual safety remains an unrealistic goal.

 

Bowser’s office recently responded to the FOIA requests I submitted in June. The records produced clearly showed that her communications staff directed the Office of the Chief Technology Officer to delete and conceal public Covid-19 data in the lead-up to reopening. I sent the records to local journalists, who quickly reported on them (one asked why I’d filed FOIAs and the only explanation I could manage was the truth: “I became very obsessed”). When questioned about this reporting, Bowser did not deny that she had removed data or reopened without meeting the metrics. She just said “that’s not news.”

Nonetheless, six days after I shared my FOIA responses, DC announced it was retiring the community spread metric. DC Health Director Dr. Laquandra Nesbitt said that the public had misunderstood the data, and that it would be replaced by clearer metrics. When DC posted a new dashboard, it looked like I had won an important battle — until I noticed that the new display is merely a static image and the accompanying charts show far less data than previous iterations, making it nearly impossible to catch any future edits or deletions. Some of the information on the new dashboard is baffling: DC has only 702,445 residents, but the city reports the number of tests performed per one million residents. A quick glance at the dashboard implies an average of 4,746 tests were performed daily in the last week of September. The actual average number of tests was only 3,334. 

The contact tracing data is more concerning. The dashboard has reported that the city attempted to contact more than 97 percent of the “close contacts” of those with positive tests within two days of the result every day for the last two months. This contact tracing is vital to containing the virus, because it allows potentially infectious people to quarantine before exposing others. However, DC recently disclosed that it actually includes all calls to close contacts in the metric, even if they were made outside of the two-day “ideal contact window.” In other words, the chart that purports to show calls made within two days actually shows calls made at literally any time. To learn this, you only have to scroll past six charts and download a PDF.

The new dashboard also retroactively adjusts nearly every Phase 2 reopening metric DC used, calibrating goals to ensure that DC’s old data met each one. The ideal transmission rate of “less than one” suddenly became “less than 1.2,” the cap for hospital occupancy was raised from 80 percent to 90 percent, and the number of people with positive test results that had to be called by contact tracers within a day was lowered from 90 percent to 80 percent. 

I’ve filed more FOIAs, but I don’t expect any further proof of data manipulation will be the nail in the coffin for DC’s reopening. Only two states, California and New Mexico, have reissued stay-at-home orders in response to nationwide post-reopening case surges. Rather than reinstating any of DC’s restrictions, Bowser is moving forward, pushing for in-person instruction at schools and approving a rooftop nightclub at the Kennedy Center. 

I remain at home in Petworth. At this point, I’m not sure I’ll ever be confident it’s safe to leave.