First-Person Shooter Ideology

For decades, historians of the twentieth century have debated why, exactly, the United States fought a protracted, destructive, and ultimately pointless Cold War with the Soviet Union. Some have claimed that the United States was simply reacting rationally to Joseph Stalin’s provocations; “the brave and essential response of free men to communist aggression,” in the words of Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. Others, including Stephen Wertheim and myself, have pointed to the traumatizing experience of the 1930s and 1940s, when the struggle with Nazism persuaded a generation of American elites that peace and prosperity depended on global U.S. supremacy. For their part, Marxist historians have insisted that the Cold War was, to borrow the conservative scholar John Lewis Gaddis’s description, about “an aggressive search for markets and investment opportunities overseas, without which the capitalist system in the United States could not survive.” And in the last two decades, a generation of scholars inspired by the work of Odd Arne Westad have argued persuasively that ideology was the key to understanding American and Soviet motivations, and that the Cold War was at base a struggle between capitalism and communism for the hearts and minds of the world. 

History is always in flux, reimagined by each new generation of scholars, and the process by which it filters down to American students in schools can be contentious. Most recently, The New York Times’s “1619 Project” sparked controversy when it established the basis for high school curricular reforms intended to “reframe U.S. history by marking the year when the first enslaved Africans arrived on Virginia soil as our nation’s foundational date.” The administration of President Donald J. Trump retaliated with its own “1776 Report,” which maintained that “distorted histories” like the “1619 Project” disrespect “students’ independence as young thinkers trying to grapple with social complexity.”

But these debates among historians, liberal journalists, and right wing politicians exist apart from the ways that knowledge of American history is actually disseminated to most “young thinkers.” Indeed, if historians, educators, commentators, and politicians really wanted to shape how youth understand U.S. history, they’d focus on the fact that an overwhelming number of people under eighteen generally first confront extended historical narratives not in the classroom, but at home, as they zonk out in front of the television and while away the best years of their lives playing video games set in Ancient Rome, Medieval Europe, or World War II.

Video games are indisputably a dominant form of entertainment in the United States. According to the (possibly generous) estimate of the Entertainment Software Association, an industry lobbying group, around 214 million Americans, roughly two-thirds of the total population, currently play them, including about 70 percent of all Americans under eighteen. As technological advances have bled other sectors of media dry, gaming has thrived, even and especially throughout the pandemic. As one Hollywood Reporter article underlined, in the third quarter of 2020 consumer spending in the gaming industry surpassed $11.2 billion, an increase of 24 percent from the previous year. For the sake of comparison, in February 2020, the month before the Covid-19 lockdowns began, domestic theater box office receipts barely topped $634 million. What movies were to the twentieth century, video games are to the twenty-first. It’s not an exaggeration to say that these games have become the primary medium through which many young Americans first encounter complex narratives about U.S. history. 

For eight out of the last eleven years, a Call of Duty game has been the top-selling video game in the United States. Call of Duty is a “first-person shooter” (FPS), a type of game in which players assume the perspective of a “shooter” who travels through varied environments killing enemies. The genre stretches from pixelated shoot-’em-ups like Wolfenstein 3D to nostalgic classics like 1997’s GoldenEye 007. And as the former’s Germanic title suggests, for decades FPS games have taken inspiration from history, with World War II — a conflict that clearly pitted “good guys” against “bad guys” — serving as a particularly common setting. 

The first Call of Duty was released in October 2003, two years after the United States invaded Afghanistan and seven months after the country invaded Iraq. The game, which was set entirely in World War II’s European Theater of Operations and which involved killing thousands of Nazis, was very much a product of the post-Cold War and post-9/11 eras. Similar to other successful cultural products of the 1990s and 2000s, from Saving Private Ryan to Band of Brothers, the first Call of Duty returned to the founding moment of the modern American Empire to justify its post-Cold War claim to being the world’s “indispensable nation.” And it was an enormous success, selling around 4.5 million copies, raking in hundreds of millions of dollars, and setting the stage for a series that now includes dozens of games that allow players to shoot people in many different times (The 1940s! The 1960s! The 2060s!) and places (Vietnam! Cuba! Southern California!). Call of Duty is that kitschy t-shirt slogan about the Marines — “Travel To Exotic Places. Meet New People. Then Kill Them” — come to electronic life.

The recently released Call of Duty: Black Ops Cold War was just named the top selling game of 2020. Right now, this one game is teaching millions of young Americans about the epic struggle between their government and the Soviet Union, a century-defining cataclysm that resulted in tens of millions of deaths, reshaped world history, and engendered the ideological struggles that presently bedevil the public sphere. But where the original Call of Duty was all rah-rah patriotism, the latest entry in the series evinces how cynical the franchise — and, by extension, American politics — has become. 

As the United States remains mired in a series of endless wars that show little sign of abating, as the nation continues to spend more on its military than the next ten countries combined, and as the country maintains access to hundreds of military bases that do little but threaten smaller powers, Americans have become willing consumers of stories that portray their nation as fallible, foolish, and maybe even a little bit evil.

 

The Call of Duty universe is broken up into three broad strands: World War II, Modern Warfare, and Black Ops, the last of which centers Special Operations Forces and spans from the Cold War far into the future. Whereas the World War II games largely adhere to the treacly tracks laid by Steven Spielberg (“America? Good. Nazis? Bad. War? Mezzo-mezzo.”), the Modern Warfare and Black Ops series are forced, by dint of their contemporary settings, to engage in some actual politics. A recent Modern Warfare title, for instance, fictionalized the infamous “highway of death,” a real-life Iraqi road bombed by the United States during the Gulf War’s final stages, as a Russian atrocity rather than an American one. In the Modern Warfare universe, war is hell, but at least the United States is (mostly) good.       

But where Modern Warfare is vanilla and self-serious, Black Ops is lurid and kooky. The games star grizzled reactionaries with tenuous government allegiances who do whatever’s necessary to protect the American way of life, and for whom the vicious immorality of that violent project is its own reward. 

Call of Duty: Black Ops Cold War begins just after Ronald Reagan’s inauguration in January 1981. Mindful of the humiliation the United States has suffered during the Iran hostage crisis, the new president has “authorized a black operation to take down two [of its] suspected masterminds.” You play as various members of the CIA team charged with this and other operations. 

After a number of twists and turns that take you from Amsterdam to Turkey to East Germany, you learn that a Soviet secret agent, codenamed “Perseus,” plans to detonate several neutron bombs earlier placed by the United States under European cities to ensure the latter never fell into enemy hands. Perseus predicts that, when he explodes the nukes, the international public will assume the United States did it, which will turn the nation into global enemy number one and spur the Soviet Union on to victory in the Cold War. 

Upon discovering this nefarious plan, you spend the rest of the game trying to find out where Perseus is located. This is when the plot takes a bizarre turn, as you are instructed to do things like infiltrate the Lubyanka Building, better known as KGB headquarters. Based on the intelligence you gather from the KGB, you eventually learn that Perseus is hiding on the White Sea’s Solovetsky Islands. In the final mission, you travel to the islands and prevent Perseus from detonating the nukes, though the secret agent himself escapes to fight another day.

In Black Ops Cold War, players assume the identities of a number of characters, including Alex Mason, a CIA operative, and Dmitri Belikov, a KGB agent on the U.S. government’s payroll. But you spend most of your time as “Bell,” the codename of the game’s protagonist. (My official character name was “Daniel ‘Bell’ Bessner,” so it was sometimes fun to imagine that my avatar was the well-known mid-century sociologist who authored The End of Ideology.)

Bell’s backstory is a tragic and confusing one. By the game’s end (spoiler alert!), you learn that he was an associate of Perseus whom one of the Iranian “masterminds” from the very first mission attempted to murder. The CIA, however, saved Bell’s life and used mind-altering drugs taken from the top secret Project MKUltra to trick him into thinking he was a long-standing CIA operative. Bell eventually learns the truth, and, though he was manipulated by the CIA, nonetheless decides to tell the Americans where Perseus is hiding, saving millions of lives. (At least, that’s the choice I made; one can also decide to lie to the Americans, which ultimately results in Bell detonating the neutron bombs hidden under Europe.)

 

In telling this story, Black Ops Cold War repeats, and refigures, one of the classic tropes of Cold War-era fiction: brainwashing. As Scott Selisker notes in Human Programming, during the Cold War thinkers and intellectuals across the political spectrum deployed the idea of brainwashing, though to different ends. For the center and the right, describing Cold War enemies, whether Soviet, Korean, or Vietnamese, as brainwashed ideological pawns “allowed Americans to imagine that the citizens of totalitarian states had been somehow conditioned, such that they became masses of human automatons, will-less and therefore less human.” Such a perspective presented the battle between capitalism and communism as a necessary struggle between a “free” world and a “slave” world, making it easier to manufacture consent for the Cold War.

Nevertheless, at the same time that Cold War propagandists presented “totalitarians” as programmed simpletons, more progressive thinkers like Ralph Ellison (in Invisible Man) and Betty Friedan (in The Feminine Mystique) turned this image on its head, claiming that it was actually oppressive American institutions that transformed people (be they African Americans or housewives) into brainwashed automatons. To take one example, and to borrow Selisker’s phrasing, Friedan’s “image of the housewife as robot [was] a way to imagine that life as subhuman.” According to Friedan, Ellison, and others, the true struggle for freedom was not found in the geopolitical arena, but at home.  

As its story unfolds in a scattershot, non-chronological fashion, Black Ops Cold War combines elements of both the left and right wing perspectives. Bell began his career an avowed “totalitarian,” an unrepentant ally of Perseus bent on destroying the United States and its freedoms. So, from the view of the center and the right, his brainwashing at the hands at the CIA was deserved and, perhaps, benevolent — at least he was now on the right (pun intended) side of history. But Black Ops Cold War simultaneously takes pains to present the CIA as morally corrupt, willing to kill Europeans with neutron bombs rather than allow them to live under Soviet domination. In the world of the game, not only is the CIA fine with murdering tens of millions of innocents, but, by virtue of its brainwashing of Bell, it is also willing to upend democracy — which by definition depends on the ability to think freely — itself.

Black Ops Cold War reflects the cynicism of the era of endless war in which it was produced, in which few people (possibly not even President Joe Biden) really think the United States remains the world’s indispensable nation. Both a perpetrator of violence and a victim of institutions beyond his control, Bell is neither a good guy nor a bad guy, just a soldier fighting wars that will one day be forgotten, based on choices over which he had no say. 

So what message would the average fourteen-year-old take away from Black Ops Cold War? To riff on a phrase coined by Mark Fisher, the game evinces an “imperialist realism” that can’t quite justify American actions abroad, but also can’t imagine a world outside of a militarily dominant U.S. empire. This idea is clearly expressed in Bell’s trigger phrase (“We’ve got a job to do”), which implicitly affirms that in the Cold War, and perhaps in every war, all a soldier can do is put his or her head down and get to work. Though nothing — not the CIA, not the Soviet Union, not even one’s own mind — can be trusted, no other world is possible, so you might as well support your own empire. 

After finishing Black Ops Cold War, our hypothetical young American will have learned very little about the actual Cold War itself. Historians have spent decades underlining the importance of ideology to the battle between the United States and the Soviet Union, but the game’s players never learn what, exactly, the two sides are fighting over; the words “capitalism” and “communism” are barely uttered. Instead, the game presents geopolitics as being about nothing but power, accepting the rather blinkered vision of so-called “realists” who reduce international relations to a struggle of might. This perspective is not just wrong — ideas, as innumerable scholars have demonstrated, inform how countries act in the world — but it also teaches young people that the only thing that matters in global politics is strength, and that they therefore must support the grotesque structures of the American empire: the 750 overseas bases, the enormous defense budget, the hundreds of thousands of troops stationed abroad. After all, the game argues, if they don’t, some other antagonist will arise to defy, and ultimately overtake, the United States. 

Black Ops Cold War thus embraces an incredibly pessimistic theory of human nature, one in which people don’t fight over ideas, or even interests, but because fighting is what people do. While on its surface, Black Ops Cold War appears to offer a critique of U.S. foreign policy, the game’s profound cynicism ensures that it can’t offer a positive program, a way out of the present stagnation. It ultimately presents conflict as a necessary feature of American, and international, life, subtly endorsing the status quo position of the U.S. foreign policy establishment, which for almost a hundred years has claimed that the only way to keep the United States safe is to build a world-spanning empire that prevents other nations from becoming too powerful. The game takes a look at the Cold War, throws up its proverbial hands, and insists that it couldn’t have gone any other way. To paraphrase Fredric Jameson: Black Ops Cold War finds it easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of American imperialism.  

Perhaps this is why the Pentagon has embraced the game as a recruiting tool. 

 

The connections between the military and gaming communities span decades, going all the way back to 1962, when MIT students created the first modern video game on a computer funded by the Department of Defense. These links have remained remarkably stable over time. In 1999, the U.S. Army granted the University of Southern California $45 million to found the Institute for Creative Technologies, whose mission, in the reporter Adi Robertson’s words, “was to draw on new entertainment tools to build military training simulations.” Then, on July 4, 2002, the military released America’s Army, which, according to the deputy director of Army Game Studio, “allows players to learn about being a Soldier by taking on the role of an American Soldier participating in force-on-force operations as part of a team.” (The most recent edition of America’s Army, Proving Grounds, came out in 2015.) Moreover, military veterans have regularly consulted with game developers to make first-person shooters more realistic and, in the process, valorize and romanticize the U.S. Armed Forces. Most infamously, Iran-Contra plotter and one-time National Rifle Association chief Oliver North appeared in the second Black Ops game, for which he was a paid consultant.

In recent years, the military has also turned to video games to recruit the next generation of troops. Officers are well aware that, as 1st Sergeant Glenn Grabbs told the Army Times in November 2018, when not in school “a big section of the [youth] population … goes into some sort of e-gaming interest.” In order “to create awareness about the Army and the opportunities it provides” and to “help make our Soldiers more visible and relatable to today’s youth,” the Army formed an eSports team. (The Navy, Air Force, Marines, and Space Force have likewise fielded eSports teams.) In collaboration with the Call of Duty Endowment — a 501(c)(3) non-profit co-founded by the CEO of Activision Blizzard (the company behind Call of Duty) to aid veterans — the military recently established the CODE Bowl, where military eSports teams play Call of Duty against each other. 

Even more important, military recruiters and affiliated eSports teams have started to play games on popular streaming platforms like Twitch. As Jordan Uhl has described a typical military stream in The Nation:  

A recruiter, usually a man in his 30s, sits comfortably in his gamer chair inside a dimly lit room illuminated by a monitor and the colorful LED lights of his computer tower. An American flag hangs on the wall behind his right shoulder, an oversized stuffed animal sits to his left. He’s playing Call of Duty or Valorant. He’s friendly, and talks about how much he loves being in the Army.”

The reach of these and other efforts is expansive. In 2019, the Army’s eSports team was seen by millions of people and, according to the Army News Service, the team has garnered 8,500 [recruiting] leads in the first four months of fiscal year 2020, more than doubling the 3,500 leads they got in all of fiscal year 2019.” 

The U.S. military, it seems, is not especially concerned about the critical messages offered in games like Black Ops Cold War. The latter, in fact, was the game played at the 2020 CODE Bowl (won by the Space Force team). To paraphrase Marshall McLuhan, the genre of “first-person shooter” is more important than the specific themes evident in individual products. It’s not difficult to see why: after I beat the latest Call of Duty, I was far more impressed by the exhilarating (if morally abhorrent) experience of mowing down thousands of enemies than I was by the confusing and elliptical story I had just been told. No critical narrative, no matter how well-constructed, can hold a candle to the visceral thrills of digital murder. And the narrative in Black Ops Cold War is not well-constructed. 

When it comes to gaming, genre matters more than content. It may not be all that important what story Black Ops Cold War — or, really, any first-person shooter  — tries to tell. (Indeed, the game’s single-player campaign is designed to last only a few hours; most of the game’s players sink the majority of their time into its multiplayer offerings.) Even if a game portrays war as hell, the thing that matters is that the player is rewarded for using cool guns to kill faceless people. Simply put, the most important fact of any FPS is that the player is required to murder with abandon, which necessarily reinforces the militarism that permeates American popular culture. The FPS genre might, in fact, be unavoidably reactionary; even an “anti-imperialist” shooter that allowed players to assume the identities of anti-colonial forces would be premised on wanton murder.

This is what the U.S. military understands, and why it’s willing to promote games like Black Ops Cold War that offer some critique of U.S. foreign policy. In the final analysis, it’s the murder, and not the message, that matters most.

The Original Karen

After Kenya declared independence from British rule in 1963, there came a flood of renamings. Schools, suburbs, and roads were rechristened in ways that spoke to a new idea of what it meant to be authentically Kenyan. In Nairobi, “Queens Way” became “Mama Ngina Street,” and roads named after the first four colonial commissioners were redesignated for African leaders: Dedan Kimathi, Muindi Mbingu, Daudi Dabasso Wabera, and Mbiyu Koinange, respectively.

One appellation that escaped the fate of the rest was “Karen” — the name of a Nairobi suburb, presumably christened for the Baroness Karen Blixen, the Danish writer also known as Isak Dinesen. Karen Estate lies seventeen kilometers west of the city centre and is one of a few Nairobi suburbs where tall jacarandas loom large, straddling long driveways onto huge mansions with plush gardens. It hosts diplomats, powerful business people, the upper strata of Kenya’s political class, expatriates, and much of Kenya’s privileged white, Asian, and Black populations.

Karen’s contemporary ethos was unintentionally revealed in a New York Times Style story about the suburb’s upscale boutiques in which every single shop-owner and fashion designer mentioned is a white woman, including the Swedish proprietor of a shop called “Bush Princess.” Karen, we learn, is “home to some of the city’s most intriguing and exclusive places to shop.” The two African women pictured, only one of them named, are both floor staff. The colonial undertones are even less veiled in a 1985 story in The Washington Post that devoted copious print inches to explaining the pains white homeowners in the “horsey suburb” took to protect their houses and “well-trimmed hedges” from Kenyan robbers. In Karen today, you can breakfast with the endangered Rothschild giraffes at Giraffe Manor, or adopt an elephant at the David Sheldrick Wildlife Trust. And, of course, you can visit the Karen Blixen Museum, in the house where the baroness once lived.

Karen Blixen, a Danish aristocrat, moved to Kenya at the height of Empire, in 1913, with her new husband, 15,000 Danish crowns, and the intention to start a coffee farm. It was only later, after she returned to Denmark in 1931, that she gradually found fame as a writer. Her 1937 memoir, Out of Africa, offers a record of her time in Kenya, detailing her relationships with her lovers, her servants, and the two thousand “Natives” who lived on her farm. As Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o, the grand old man of Kenyan letters, later wrote, “As if in compensation for unfulfilled desires and longings, the baroness turned Kenya into a vast erotic dreamland in which her several white lovers appeared as young gods and her Kenyan servants as usable curs and other animals.”

And dreamland she made it. On safari, Blixen’s servants carried bathwater to her on their heads across the plain, and, she writes, “when we outspanned at noon, they constructed a canopy against the sun, made out of spears and blankets, for me to rest under.” She imagines herself a judge to the Kikuyu squatters, claiming at one point that she looks at her cook “with something of a creator’s eyes.” To Blixen, the Africans existed if not quite at the level of the bush animals, then somewhere just above them. “The Natives,” she writes, “could withdraw into a world of their own, in a second, like the wild animals which at an abrupt movement from you are gone—simply are not there.” She believed that “the umbilical cord of Nature has, with them, not been quite cut through.” 

Deserted by her husband, Karen threw herself into the hedonistic social life available to the European gentry in the colony. When the Duke and Prince of Wales came to visit, she made the local Kikuyu perform a dance in their honor. She and her lover, British big game hunter Denys Finch-Hatton, oscillated in and out of the “Happy Valley set,” described by Ulf Aschan, the godson of Blixen’s husband, as “relentless in their pursuit to be amused, more often attaining this through drink, drugs, and sex.” A popular question among British aristocrats at the time was, “Are you married or do you live in Kenya?” None of this appears in Blixen’s memoir, which skips over wild parties in favor of providing lush detail about the landscape and the “Natives.”

Karen Blixen in 1913, “shortly before my departure for Africa,” according to the handwritten text. Photograph by Sophus Juncker-Jensen.

 

In The New York Review of Books, American critic Jane Kramer called Out of Africa “without a doubt the most irresistible prose ever written about East Africa.” A bestseller, it was selected for the Book-of-the-Month Club, included in the Modern Library series “100 Best Nonfiction Books,” and translated into multiple languages. Blixen’s name was regularly floated as a candidate for the Nobel Prize in Literature. When Ernest Hemingway — a regular hunting partner of Blixen’s husband, Bror — won the prize in 1954, he suggested it should have gone to her instead. (She was reportedly closest in 1961, when she was passed over for Ivo Andrić.)

In 1985, the memoir was adapted into a film directed by Sydney Pollack and starring Meryl Streep and Robert Redford. The plot, which draws on several additional sources including Blixen’s second memoir, Shadows on the Grass, and Judith Thurman’s biography of Blixen, is primarily focused on Blixen’s romance with Finch-Hatton. It brought in $227.5 million at the box office and swept the Oscars, winning seven awards including Best Picture and Best Director, and propelling the image of Kenya as a romantic gateway into popular imagination. 

The year after the film’s release, Kenya saw a dramatic spike in tourism (from 152,000 visitors to 176,000 in a single year), and the house Blixen once lived in was converted into a museum. By 1987, the tourism sector had become a tentpole of Kenya’s economy, bringing in approximately $350 million annually. By the end of the decade that figure had grown to $443 million per year, roughly 40 percent of Kenya’s total foreign exchange.

Barack Obama recounted his first visit to Kenya in 1988, writing that he suspected some tourists “came because Kenya, without shame, offered to re-create an age when the lives of whites in forest lands rested comfortably on the backs of the darker races.” He was struck by Nairobi’s stark racial hierarchies, something he hadn’t anticipated seeing in his father’s homeland. “In Kenya,” he wrote, “A white man could still walk through Isak Dinesen’s home and imagine romance with a mysterious young baroness.”

 

Prior to the violence of colonialism, the 6,000 acres Blixen called her own had belonged to the very “Natives” about whom she rhapsodized in her memoir. Wanton theft is at the core of colonial Kenya, which the British established as a settlers’ frontier, parceling off land to European adventurers. The first batch of settlers received their land grants in 1902. It included British aristocrats like Lords Delamere, Hindlip, and Cranworth, who set the gold standard for a gilded countryside hunter lifestyle. Later, the British government expanded lease offerings and exempted settlers from the land tax, and in 1920, the protectorate officially became a colony. But coffee and cattle, the colonial industries of choice, were expensive to produce, and Kenya earned a reputation as a “big man’s frontier,” a place where only the extremely wealthy could afford to settle. 

The Blixens were part of this wave of settlers. Their land, previously Maasai pastoral country and Gikuyu farmland, became “a farm in Africa at the foot of the Ngong Hills” — Out of Africa’s famous opening line. Ngũgĩ calls settlers like the Blixens “parasites in paradise.” He writes, “Kenya, to them, was a huge winter home for aristocrats, which of course meant big-game hunting and living it up on the backs of a million field and domestic slaves.”

With its warm climate and its stunning landscapes, colonial Kenya was an attractive getaway for European aristocrats looking to escape the winter chill, and colonial planners catered to their needs. In his 1902 book, Garden Cities of To-Morrow, the British urban planner Ebenezer Howard had laid out his ideal “garden city,” which combined the best features of urban and rural life. The parts of Nairobi that were segregated for whites were planned as garden cities, with deliberate care taken, for instance, to plant jacaranda trees en masse. 

A diagram by Ebenezer Howard in To-Morrow: A Peaceful Path to Real Reform, London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., Ltd., 1898

 

Meanwhile, Africans were consigned to live in what the architectural historians A. M. Martin and P. M. Bezemer have called “villages on garden city lines.” Africans were not even allowed to settle permanently within city limits. Their settlements, along with those of the Indian workers brought in by the British as railway builders, were viewed as potential public health threats to Europeans and deliberately placed far from white suburbs. A 1941 report by the African Housing Board proposed that this housing strategy would teach “Native” residents to observe elementary rules of hygiene. In white Nairobi, safe from the scourge of non-Europeans, residents could live charmed existences in a green paradise. It’s an idea — and a marketing strategy — that persists for both tourists and residents: Uhuru Kenyatta, Kenya’s President and the scion of the nation’s richest family, made headlines in December for affirming his commitment to restoring Nairobi’s worldwide reputation as a “Green City in the Sun.”

After the Great Depression, Blixen was forced to leave Kenya and sell her family’s now-bankrupt plantation, Karen Coffee Company (which, confusingly, was either named after Blixen or her cousin). The buyer, developer Remi Martin, subdivided the land into ten- and twenty-acre plots and kept the name “Karen.” Heralded by advertisements in the early 1930s as a place for “contentment in retirement,” the new estate boasted such activities as golf, tennis, polo, fishing, and shooting. “All the Amenities without the Disadvantages of Town,” one advertisement read. Here was the ideal garden city.

I live in Machakos, a county to the east of Nairobi, but I went to college in Nairobi. I recently decided to visit Karen, on the far end of the city. As a Black Kenyan man, it’s likely that if I were to walk alone in Karen, I’d be questioned and asked for identification. This is not particular to Karen; all the wealthy neighborhoods in Nairobi are rife with physical barriers and security guards who carefully screen visitors. Before independence, an African was not allowed inside Nairobi without a permit and a kipande (a metal plate worn around the neck detailing basic personal details, fingerprints, and employment history), and in neighborhoods like Karen, discrimination persists against those assumed not to belong. 

In light of its sheer expanse and my lingering fear that I’d be stopped, I asked a friend to be my guide. Linda, who is Black and lives in Karen, agreed, and we drove around the suburb, playing tourists in colonial Nairobi, before heading to the museum. The estate is picturesque: potted plants hang from street signs, and tall croton trees hide old English colonial bungalows. On one road, a sign announced, “No Horses Allowed Beyond This Point.” A gate bore a placard reading, “Out of Africa.” As we drove, we talked about the “Karen Cowboys,” a group associated in Nairobi with the Karen Estate.

Perhaps no figure better illuminates the links between contemporary Kenya and its colonial past than the Karen Cowboy. Sometimes also called Kenyan Cowboys, KCs are descendants of European colonialist-settlers, and they, as Linda put it to me, “live in a separate universe.”

KCs are modern-day descendants of the Happy Valley set. Their parents, grandparents, or great-grandparents came to Kenya and acquired land as participants in the violence of the British colonial project. They revel in the settler-colonist aesthetic, keeping horses, dressing in cargo pants and safari boots, and driving old Land Cruisers and Land Rovers. Families maintain accounts at the Karen Provision Store, and children are sent to posh British-curriculum schools in Nairobi. Some are cash-poor but asset-rich, with land that has “always” been in their families — frequently this includes luxury tented camps at the Maasai Mara, Kenya’s premier safari destination. Many have a wealth of information about the country of Kenya and can speak Swahili, but keep themselves isolated from the Kenyan population. As Susan, a British-born white woman who moved to Karen in the 1970s to marry an African man, explained, KCs are characterized by their ‘cowboy lifestyle.’ “They go on safari, go drinking, go riding, have fun,” she said. “That’s what’s important to them.”

One of the more publicly recognizable avatars of KC culture was Tom Cholmondeley, the Nairobi-born, Eton-educated great-grandson of Lord Delamere, one of colonial Kenya’s earliest British settlers and “progenitor of Kenya’s most famous white family.” Cholmondeley was convicted in 2009 of killing stonemason Robert Njoya on his family’s 50,000-acre ranch. Njoya was the second Kenyan man Cholmondeley had shot and killed in as many years, claiming self-defense against potential robbery and poaching. His girlfriend Sally Dudmesh, a British jewelry designer and member of the “hard-partying expat set,” visited him regularly during his nearly four-year stint in prison. “For me, it really feels like I’ve been in prison,” she complained to the Evening Standard. “I’m really suffering. This is beyond what a human being can tolerate.” In fact, Dudmesh lives at The Ngong Dairy, the house in Karen that was used as Blixen’s in the film Out of Africa. As she once said in an interview, to her, Kenya represents “a sort of wildness, a spirit of adventure. There’s an incredible freedom and scope to Africa that you don’t find in England.” 

Often, KCs champion animal conservation, painting the often-poor pastoral communities who live in proximity to conservancies as poachers and destroyers of the environment and wildlife. This mode of conservation, prominent Kenyan carnivore ecologist Mordecai Ogada has argued, “Remains firmly in the ‘Victorian gamekeeper’ mode,” where conservation is about protecting wildlife from lower classes so that the elite can enjoy the wildlife for themselves. Most of the sanctuaries in Kenya are owned by settler families who stayed in Kenya after independence, gaining Kenyan citizenship, or by people who subsequently bought them from the settler families. The latter group consists largely of wealthy Europeans and African members of the ruling class. 

 

Though Karen Estate remains a colonial-aristocratic suburb, it’s not immune to change. Some of the old houses, with stables ensuite, have been demolished and replaced with apartment complexes. Cabro roads have been laid, and townhouses erected. There are malls now, and other developments afoot. In response, the Karen Lang’ata District Association, arguably the most powerful homeowners’ association in Kenya, has swung into action. Established in 1940, the Association’s mandate is to fight perceived threats to the prestige of the suburb. These threats include footpaths that serve as access routes for low-income laborers (the association has called them getaway routes for criminals) and kiosks that offer affordable supplies (hideouts for criminals).

And not everyone who lives in Karen today is white. No longer the exclusive enclaves of rich Europeans, the neighborhood is now the almost-as-exclusive enclave of rich and upper-middle-class Europeans, Asians, and Africans. I spoke with Naila Aroni and Dana Osiemo, two Black Kenyan women in their twenties who grew up in Karen, where Black families were the exception. Both told me that informal segregation was common during their childhood, and that they and their friends still avoid going to certain white-frequented places. “You hear how some white people think that too many Black people are moving in so they want to move out because the place is being spoilt,” Osiemo recounts.

A combination of nonwhite house owners, the proliferation of apartment blocks, and the encroachment of urban Nairobi has shifted the colonial-aristocratic ideal 250 kilometers north, to the plains of Laikipia, which offer more land and animals to hunt. Today, landowners in Laikipia and its environs include Guy Wildenstein, a close associate of former French president Nicholas Sarkozy, who owns a 58,000-acre farm; Fauna & Flora International, which owns the 90,000-acre Ol Pejeta Conservancy that previously belonged to the arms dealer Adnan Khashoggi; former Puma CEO Jochen Zeitz, who owns the 50,000-acre Segera Ranch; and Kuki Gallman, who owns the 100,000-acre Ol Ari Nyiro Ranch and whose book, I Dreamed of Africa, is described by its publisher, Penguin, as a “love letter to the magical spirit of Africa.” Then there’s Ian Craig, the charity-minded aristocrat who converted his family’s 62,000-acre cattle ranch into a rhino sanctuary at the peak of the elephant and rhino poaching epidemic of the 1970s. The property was later renamed Lewa Wildlife Conservancy, and it was there that Prince William, whose family made a fortune off colonial plunder, proposed to Kate Middleton in 2010. The Telegraph breathlessly recounted the site of the engagement in high Blixen-ese: “Lying at the foothills of Mount Kenya the ‘rustic and ultra-private’ Rutundu log cabin made a romantic setting for the Prince to pop the big question.”

At the Karen Blixen Museum, our guide Thamima explained to Linda and me that Blixen fought for the right of girls to attend school. She told us about Blixen’s friendship with Berkeley Cole, an Anglo-Irish aristocrat from Ulster and prominent settler-colonialist in Kenya. She also talked about Finch-Hatton, and how his death wrecked Blixen; his grave lies in the Ngong’ Hills.

The house showcases the material artifacts of Blixen’s life in Kenya: the leopard skin on the living room floor; the gun rack, lion skin, and Louis Vutton suitcase in Bror’s bedroom; the bedside table made from the foot of an elephant the two of them hunted; their china, their linen, the table at which they entertained Prince Edward, who was later, briefly, King of England. Some of these items are originals, but others are stand-ins donated by the National Museum. Boots, hats and coats in the wardrobe, as well as aprons in the kitchen, are costume pieces from the movie, worn by Streep and Redford in 1985.

I asked Thamima how it feels, as an African, to talk about a white colonialist all day long. “I enjoy interacting with people,” she told me. “And she wasn’t all bad. We have to take the good.”

The Karen Blixen Museum in Nairobi, Kenya. Photograph by Alexander Leisser.

 

In the Western (especially British) imagination, Kenya occupies an outsize place. Writing in The Guardian in 2019, Afua Hirsch observed that Africa is synonymous with Kenya in the “British tourist lexicon.” At the root of this romanticization of the country is Blixen and the blockbuster adaptation of her story, which drew on colonial-era British notions of the African frontier while conveniently erasing the violence of empire, a paradox that saturates safari tourism more broadly. For just a few thousand dollars a night, one can live in the romantic utopia that is Africa, where the spirit of the land will replenish one’s dying spirits.  

Tourist brochures of Kenya still describe it as the aristocratic utopia of Blixen’s memory. CNN recommends a list of luxury camps, with the first named after Redford’s movie character: “Finch Hattons is a place for people who have a feel for bygone romance.” In the Mara, the Karen Blixen Camp describes itself as “an eco-friendly luxury camp that gives a sense of the exciting explorer days when the savannah was seldom visited and elaborate and comfortable camps were set up providing a luxurious and stylish retreat after each day’s adventure.”

Then there is Giraffe Manor, a ten-minute drive from the Karen Blixen Museum, which similarly advertises itself as a throwback to Kenya’s colonial past. “With its stately façade, elegant interior, verdant green gardens, sunny terraces and delightful courtyards, guests often remark that it’s like walking into the film Out of Africa,” the website reads. “Indeed, one of its twelve rooms is named after the author Karen Blixen.” Another is named for Finch-Hatton. This “is not a statement about colonization,” insists Julia Perowne, founder and CEO of Perowne International, the London-based agency that handles PR and communication for the Safari Collection, the group of luxury safari destinations of which the Manor is part. Blixen and Finch-Hatton, she assures me, are simply “famous people who everyone in Africa knows.”

A cursory glance at the Giraffe Manor’s ownership offers a crash course in the Karen Cowboy phenomenon. Giraffe Manor is part of the Safari Collection, owned by Tanya and Mikey Carr-Hartley, “fourth-generation Kenyans each with long histories in East Africa,” i.e., their families came to Kenya as part of the British colonial project. According to the masthead provided on the Collection’s website, “Mikey grew up on a 45,000-acre ranch in Laikipia, tracking animals in the footsteps of his grandfather, who was a renowned wildlife handler.” Meanwhile, “Tanya spent her childhood on Loldia Farm on the shores of Lake Naivasha in the Great Rift Valley, helping to manage and conserve the family farm.” The two of them, we are told, “share a mutual love of the Kenyan landscape and its wildlife and have dedicated their lives to protecting it.”

Early in 2020, Giraffe Manor found itself in the eye of a storm when Ahnasa Destinations Ltd, the PR agency handling its affairs in Kenya, announced on Instagram that, due to a catastrophic downturn in overseas tourism brought about by Covid-19, the manor was now accepting Kenyan visitors. In the wake of public anger at the insinuation that the property had not previously been open to Kenyans (among other allegations of racism at the Manor), Ahnasa Destinations hastily deleted its post, and the hotel announced that it had always welcomed everyone, regardless of colour, tribe, religion, sex, or nationality. Yet it is impossible to ignore the fact that the website featuring videos of visitors breakfasting with giraffes and frolicking on the grounds of the manor includes a grand total of zero Black faces. As Perowne told me directly, the manor “wasn’t for everyone.” When I prodded further, she backtracked, saying that the Manor was open to everyone, but that booking two years in advance was required. “Stop looking for something where there is nothing,” she concluded. 

 

Rather like the Irish writer Joyce Cary’s books on Nigeria, Blixen’s work was widely accepted in the U.S. and Europe as an accurate description of Kenya. The film, which has recently been added to Netflix and HBO Max, has ensured that she remains a visible exponent of aristocratic colonial nostalgia.  

The final section of Out of Africa sees Blixen lamenting the death of her perfect Kenya. A string of factors — the decimation of wildlife herds by European hunters, increased industrialization and agricultural production by the colonial government, the fact that middle-ranking officers in the British army had been settled in the colony, and the 1929 financial crisis — meant that change was afoot. Unmentioned by Blixen, but also present, were political rebellions by Africans against British colonial rule. A few years later, there would even be armed resistance, close to Nairobi, by the Mau Mau against the British settlers. Blixen, by then, was long gone.

Kenya’s settler class was never again as powerful as the settler class in, say, Zimbabwe, another former British colony in Africa. However, at independence, the country’s governance was seized by a cabal of men who had been in collaboration with the colonial state. Instead of putting an end to the colonial caste system, these men merely sought to join its ranks, which meant, among other things, acquiring houses in posh suburbs like Lavington, Muthaiga, and Karen. In a few years, the Kenyatta family, whose patriarch Jomo was the first president of the Republic, stood alongside old British aristocratic families like the Delamares in the hierarchy of the largest landowners in the country. Meanwhile, the legacy of the settler-colonial class lives on in the Karen Cowboy set and the luxury tourism circuit. The safari, rather than the hunt, has become the dominant mode of viewing Kenya’s wilderness.

In Nairobi, lack of planning means that the best-designed neighborhoods, and hence the locations of the most desirable real estate, are the former colonial suburbs. Driving away from the museum, Linda told me why she likes living in Karen: the quiet; the distance from the city center; the trees and foliage; the large open spaces; the evident planning. All of which is exactly how Karen was sold to prospective residents a hundred years ago. Nostalgia is not the sole purview of the KCs: Linda pointed out some of the newer houses in the suburb, dismissing them as ostentatious, soulless developments. 

The uncomfortable fact remains that in Nairobi, alternatives to colonial nostalgia are often unattractive. The developed parts of the city least in thrall to the bygone empire are temples to urban sprawl and thoughtless retailification, represented by suburban megamalls like Two Rivers and Garden City. While Nairobi lays out the blueprint for the tallest building in Africa — entering a four-way fight for continental dominance with South Africa, Morocco, and Egypt — nearly three-quarters of the city’s population live in slums. The colonial, British-built railway from Nairobi to Mombasa has been swapped out for a modern, Chinese-built one — which runs through, and thus degrades, one of the city’s greatest treasures, Nairobi National Park. Meanwhile, new mega-highways are constantly under construction across the city. We have yet to articulate a positive vision of authentic and sustainable Kenyan urban design to match the streets that were renamed after independence. So we continue to be in thrall to Karen — and the Karens — around us.

Karen Blixen wrote, in a letter to her sister, that some people “have the gift of ‘making myths’; their personalities remain alive in people’s consciousness as well as their works.”

As the myth of Blixen and her cohort persists — and continues to shape the landscape and destiny of Kenya and its people — the questions today are, “whose myth?” And “whose country?”