A Pool of One’s Own

No friendships worthy of Flaubert’s exacting pen emerge from the Ursuline convent of Emma Bovary’s schooldays. Blame it on the local black market. Out of sight of the nuns, a matronly seamstress stashes books “full of love and lovers” in her apron smocks and slips copies to the older girls — hypnotizing tales of moonlit crossings, fainting damsels, horses ridden to death by perpetually late beaux. Only lovers (noblemen in cloaks) count here, while other attachments get short shrift.

Transported to our era, today’s Emma — in leggings, not smocks — might favor a different sort of book, one that gives pride of place not to male lovers but to female friends. If the romance novel was once the genre of fashionable sincerity, then a more affable successor has come to supplant it. Swooning and sobbing are out; an upbeat sisterhood is in. This genre occupies a different register of preciousness, one set amidst an egalitarian milieu that, the reader is made to understand, only the company of other women can offer. More even than lust or the winning marriage, latter-day Emmas seek the depths of sorority, the complex confidences, rivalries, and private languages shared among women. Perhaps the novel of love did not just peter out. Rather, it shape-shifted into the novel of “female friendship.” 

An idle observer of the cultural marketplace might have noticed something of an inflection point in the mid-2010s, when the trope of female companionship began to heavily pervade fiction and film: novels by Elena Ferrante (and “Ferrante fever” ephemera), Sheila Heti, Zadie Smith, Sally Rooney, and series and films directed by Lena Dunham and Greta Gerwig, in which best friends, not boyfriends, star. Cheerleaders behind the New York Times culture desk chanted headlines like: “Sisterhood (and Friendship) Is Powerful,” “A Debut Calls a Ferrante-Style Female Friendship to the Fore,” and (a real gem, this) “A Call to Action for Girl Squads Everywhere.” Men, meanwhile, seemed to be suffering something of a friendship drought. Corresponding headlines carped: “The Challenges of Male Friendships,” “Can’t Guys Just Learn to Fight for a Friendship?” and even in the science section, “Why Male Baboons Benefit from Female Friends.” 

It is easy enough to sketch a composite image of the female friend, tin-stamped with sheepish heroism. Invariably an artist or writer, or trying hard to be one, she has yet to produce her great masterpiece and is afflicted by feelings of fraudulence. Often her status as an artist may seem more a clamorous speech act than an earnest sign of resolve. Yet she is quick (too quick) to call her own bluff. Her companion — the one with the wilder hair, rawer talent, but sometimes consigned a dimmer fate — she is the true artist. So the protagonist laments. If the visible world of friendship is formed in love and protective urges, the more obscure backdrop is often enough formed in envy and rivalry. 

Does the luster of the female friend emerge in compensatory fashion at a time when it is especially financially daunting (or ideologically unappealing) for many women to form a family? Has this niche proven a winning formula for a book industry catering to a readership skewing more than a smidge female (80 percent)? Putting such cynical speculations to the side, a girl-power generation has spoken with the confessional flair of Flaubert himself: “Madame Bovary, c’est moi”!

And publishers have taken note. Following the friendship boom, a more recent spate of group biographies of female writers and artists works a similar terrain, surveying the social worlds women have forged on their own defiant terms. Fortunes here are shaped by Parnassian pals, and lives oriented against patriarchal slights. But if Emma Bovary erred in viewing trite art as a model for life, the trade-press historian risks viewing it as an efficient formula for the writing of the past. One gathers that the (female?) reader is meant to experience a frisson of uplift and admiring recognition throughout. More often, you can feel you are getting a peppy archetype in the place of any difficult reckoning with the making of art or social relations. The female friend certainly sells books. But does she offer a way of capturing the lives of artists?

 

Some of these recent group biographies do outfox the powerful industry trend, steering clear of facile tropes and uninspired feminisms. Mary Gabriel’s Ninth Street Women (2018) forthrightly admits that the female Abstract Expressionists hurling down paint and kicking around canvases would have flinched at the very term “female artist.” This is not a book about sisterhood that would dare silo off Lee Krasner, Elaine de Kooning, Grace Hartigan, Joan Mitchell, and Helen Frankenthaler from their male counterparts carousing and confabulating at Cedar Tavern. And yet, to some, the women’s capsule-sized bios seemed readymade for another medium altogether: Amazon Studios has bought the rights to make the book a television series, to be directed by the same team behind such avant-garde triumphs as “Gilmore Girls” and “The Marvelous Mrs. Maisel.” (Frankenthaler’s boyfriend, the Partisan Review critic Clement Greenberg, popularized just the term for art that crosses the velvet rope cordoning off the refined from the rabble: kitsch.)

Though unlikely to be optioned anytime soon, Deborah Nelson’s Tough Enough (2017) and Michelle Dean’s Sharp (2018) also scrupulously avoid any hint of sentimentalism. The women in Nelson’s brilliant study — Arbus, Arendt, Didion, McCarthy, Sontag, and Weil — eschewed emotional expression in the face of worldly pain, while never entirely succumbing to an affectless hard-edged skepticism. Among Nelson’s subjects, only Mary McCarthy and Hannah Arendt became pals, on a subway platform after an editorial meeting for Dwight Macdonald’s short-lived magazine, politics. But their friendship is unrecognizable in the terms of the fictional female friend. They saw in one another, as Nelson puts it, a “preference for solitude over solidarity.” Acid tongues, not eager sociability, unite the women in Sharp too. “Irony, sarcasm, ridicule: these can be the tools of outsiders, a by-product of the natural skepticism towards conventional wisdom that comes when you haven’t been able to participate in its formulation,” observes Dean. Both books successfully name 20th-century sensibilities — the loosey-goosey nature of a sensibility being “one of the hardest things to talk about,” Sontag herself observed in “Notes on Camp.”

But other submissions to the genre take a decidedly different tack. Instead of sidelining sentimentality, they create a historical backdrop for it. The resulting group biographies are mawkish histories of women who opposed mawkishness. Virginia Woolf once herself encountered the challenge of pinning down the elusive iridescence of a life in biographic writing, we learn in Francesca Wade’s Square Haunting (2020). “How does one euphemise 20 different mistresses?” Woolf asked, midway through the bio she was writing. When the subject was an apparent philanderer, and his mourning family was providing the archive — boxes of “tailor’s bills, love letters, and old picture postcards” — the question was a live one. As Woolf chased after the riddle, we learn, she lived on Mecklenburgh Square, where she shared real estate with other writers between the World Wars. Historian Eileen Power, classicist Jane Ellen Harrison, detective novelist Dorothy L. Sayers, and poet H.D. (the nom de plume of Hilda Doolittle) all variously took up residence on the square in Bloomsbury (D.H. Lawrence called it the “dark, bristling heart of London”).

If one assumes Leopold Bloom’s timeless definition of a nation in Ulysses — “the same people living in the same place” — then Wade has discovered a very small, very erudite nation indeed. That the conceit is more poetical than rigorously historical is hardly a defect. The book might have come closer to offering a quiet meditation in the vein of Fleur Jaeggy’s These Possible Lives (with lush biographies of Thomas De Quincey, John Keats, and Marcel Schwob) if it did not insist on its PBS-style signposting, blaring orchestra and all. Must we hear one more time that “it was the help of women, and the support of a female institution,” (in this instance Cambridge’s Newnham College) that changed these women’s fortunes? Or that “their lives in the square demonstrate the challenges, personal and professional, that met — and continue to meet — women who want to make their voices heard”?

One can be heart and soul for women’s voices being heard, but also eager to hear them say something beyond that they want their voices to be heard. Unfortunate in Square Hauntings and some of these other recent “women who changed the world” books — i.e. titles I wish I were making up: Outsiders: Five Women Writers Who Changed the World; Visionary Women: How Rachel Carson, Jane Jacobs, Jane Goodall and Alice Waters Changed Our World; The Life and Times of Butch Dykes: Portraits of Artists, Leaders, and Dreamers Who Changed the World; and (breaking the mold, those rebels) The Book of Gutsy Women by Chelsea and Hillary Rodham Clinton — is the lack of animating ideas other than a pat mission statement: to wit, that women (for the most part, white and well-educated) remain grotesquely underrepresented and that we can better represent them and their historical achievements. 

Gutsy women turn gusty. Wade intones, “They refused to let their gender hold them back, but were determined to find a different way of living, one in which their creative world would take precedence.” Beholden to this simplistic framework, Square Haunting tends to boil down to a recovery project of previous recovery projects — a feminist archival infinite regress. We read of Harrison researching matrilineal descent and “matriarchal, husbandless goddesses” among the Greeks, of Power’s penning her tome on medieval nunneries, of Woolf’s plan to write the lives of our mothers and grandmothers, of H.D.’s musings on the collective voices of female Greek choruses.

This spiralizing retrospective can leave one wondering: when we are at the point at which historians are recovering the recover-ers, might it be time to shift the set of questions slightly — to ask, perhaps, why this infuriating exclusion exists in the tradition of modernism to begin with? Apparently not: Wade has signed on a double-book contract for two new group biographies, one involving Gertrude Stein and Alice Toklas and another, set in 1970s New York, that tells “the story of the decade through the interconnected lives and experiences of a group of female poets and activists….”

 

The latest spinoff comes in the form of Maggie Doherty’s The Equivalents: A Story of Art, Female Friendship, and Liberation in the 1960s (2020), which was recently chosen as a finalist for the National Book Critics Circle’s annual award for best biography. The book showcases a group of five writers and artists at the Radcliffe Institute, where women with PhDs or their artistic ‘equivalent,’ hence the title, were granted a $3,000 stipend (around $25,000 today), along with an office in the yellow house at 78 Mount Auburn Street in Cambridge, Massachusetts. We learn in the preface that this is, thank god, “a story of how [these women] changed the world” — and what “remains to be done.” And why five women, yet again? Quintets work well enough, whether for the Spice Girls or Rona Jaffe’s The Best of Everything (The Wing’s Audrey Gelman wrote on Twitter that this was “the book that inspired everything 4 me”). Or perhaps, two episodes per woman equals… one Amazon season? Whatever the reason, the historical Herland once more over-schematizes and over-determines the past.

The collective template adopted in this rendition also means that the artist is hardly ever alone — socially as well as politically. The women’s well-funded gabbing and swanning is presumed to have momentous political implications. The account then can seem to participate in a signature vice of our times — the tendency of those in rarified milieus to too readily identify broader political struggles with their own positioning in specialized economies of esteem. The possibility that the gilded goings-on at the Radcliffe Institute might be something other than an egalitarian experiment fits only intermittently into the story of liberation that Doherty aspires to tell. Rather, The Equivalents presents the hallowed “female community” at Radcliffe as worthy of “adapt[ing] their ideas and approaches to our own time,” no matter that the friend group solidified into a clique for petty horse-trading. With the Institute’s patronage and friendships, Doherty claims, the glamorous self-alienation of housewives, some encased in Cape Cod colonials, was transformed into professional seriousness and artistic transcendence.

Students at the Radcliffe Institute, 1960. Photograph by Patricia Hollander. Harvard University/Radcliffe College Archives, TC 179-2-35.


Across nearly two decades,
Equivalents follows a circle of artists in New England, writing, painting, and sculpting their way out of the grey-flannelled fifties: poets Anne Sexton and Maxine Kumin, writer Tillie Olsen, and artists Barbara Swan and Marianna Pineda. Sexton — who is the most shrewdly social and the most central to the narrative — befriends Kumin in an adult-education poetry workshop in Boston in 1957. “Kumin could seem at first to be Sexton’s twin,” Doherty writes of the Newton neighbors. Like the classic female friend narrator, Sexton suffers great insecurities, particularly regarding her abbreviated education. “My qualifications are unique — uniquely wrong,” she typed for a throwaway draft of the Radcliffe application. At parties she feels more at ease: “She helped herself to whatever alcohol was on offer and then pranced around the room, shouting with delight at her friends’ brilliant lines.” And like the trope, too, she is poised between opposing feelings of love and jealousy towards other women. “I read Tillie Olsen’s story and I cried and I was ashamed to have my story appear… She is a genius.” Yet without a “creative community,” Doherty reports, “Sexton found writing nearly impossible.” 

So strong is the emphasis placed on female mutual aid and stylized feminist liberation that this history can largely function as a work of omission. Nuances of artistic imagination, less suited to the theme, are glided over like the subterranean depths of a frozen sea. (On thin ice, speed is safety, Emerson said.) The raw-nerved confessional poems and paintings, stories and sculptures of Equivalents are glossed with breathless but cursory praise, as if they were indifferently hyped items in a seller’s catalogue. The Brookline painter Barbara Swan is introduced as making “portraits… that exposed the sitter’s soul.” Kumin, we are told a few times, possessed great “powers of observation.” Sexton’s pivotal suite of poems (“Unknown Girl in a Maternity Ward”; “The Double Image”; “You, Doctor Martin”) is summarized as Sexton’s beginning “to discover her knack for image making.” Tillie Olsen planned to write a proletarian novel that, Doherty writes, “would underscore the importance of all human lives.” The women, their work, and their friendships are called “remarkable” at least nine times. Concluding with a line in which Kumin cheers “hooray” for Adrienne Rich’s Of Woman Born, this rah-rah cultural history is itself administered in a prose style that is not always hard-won: “The women compared suicide attempts and munched on potato chips,” Doherty writes of Anne Sexton and Sylvia Plath at the Boston Ritz-Carlton. Or else: “Women like Sexton and Kumin didn’t want to amputate their passions.” 

And men? What men? As if hell-bent on passing the Bechdel test on every last page, Doherty produces a world in which the presence of men is oddly minimized. She slips Sexton’s love affairs, one in Rome and one in Boston with poet and Houghton Mifflin editor George Starbuck, away in censorious parentheses — even as the latter connection helped Sexton land her first book deal. Similarly tucked away, somewhat brutally, in a parenthetical is the fate of Adrienne Rich’s husband: he shot himself after their divorce. In Doherty’s recounting, men only get star turns when they can be portrayed as big bad wolves, no matter how petty the scale. For his efforts to meddle in the friendship of Kumin and Sexton, the obscure poet John Holmes (who found his former student Sexton “utterly selfish, blood-sucking, destructive”) wins five admonishing pages.

Doherty’s scene-setting of New England’s “competitive, treacherous literary climate” leads to the purported fix, where the friends first convene: a Harvard institution founded in 1961, in the solemnly purposive Cold War rhetoric of the day, “to generate educated womanpower.” “One could only imagine the conversations that it would start,” Doherty writes in her canned rhapsodizing. The truth was that in 1960 microbiologist and new president of Radcliffe College Mary Ingraham Bunting discerned dead weight in her midst. “Every one of these neat little brick houses has at least one woman who doesn’t seem to have enough to do,” she observed. Bunting — who backed out of co-authoring The Feminine Mystique, repelled by Betty Friedan’s “polemical” style — stopped well short of the daughters in revolt. She billed the new Institute for “intellectually displaced” women as familial and, if not “feminist” per se, then a kind of course correction for mothers who had gotten “off track.” Deftly, Sexton let slip in her Institute interview that she had “recently canceled a meeting with a very important publisher because she’d promised her daughters that they would go visit the pussy willows.”

In one whiplash-inducing scene, Doherty runs down the profiles of desperate applicants who did not land Institute interviews — many with no formal education, with no money — then cuts to Sexton hollering “I got it!” down her street in prim Newton. For the poet, contribution to her household’s finances was revolutionary. “Since I started to make money and get status, I don’t feel so guilty because I’m contributing,” Doherty quotes Sexton, who came from a New England wool fortune. 

Not so for Sexton’s contemporaries, who had not, with Olympic synchronization, “put down their books and wrenches and picked up spatulas” after the war, as Doherty writes. In chapters on writers Tillie Olsen and Alice Walker (an Institute fellow from 1971 to 1973), Doherty later concedes that the age’s home-making idyll excluded working-class and Black women. But her exuberant tone tends to jettison such scruples in addressing the “talented” women of the era: “[Y]ou have the perfect life: you have the high-earning husband, the rosy-cheeked children, and the Buick in the driveway.” If only. In stray sentences she qualifies, but the fact is that many women after World War II were forced to adjust to lower-salary work, not freed into bland abundance. By 1960, almost a third of married women worked, earning on average 60 percent of men’s wages. 

For women of Sexton’s social class, the Institute stipend offered a frivolous new allowance (an upward redistribution of wealth), funding domestic help, Cambridge parking tickets, home offices, and even a private swimming pool. Doherty defends that last expenditure: to Sexton, she writes, “the pool was an invaluable, therapeutic addition to her daily routine. It became a daily ritual. She swam her laps languidly, her long body slicing through the water. With her eyes closed, listening to birdsong, she could reimagine the stultifying suburbs as a kind of pastoral idyll.” A pool of one’s own? Unlike Herman Melville, who borrowed in advance against his later books (with interest), landing him in debt to Harper’s almost his whole life, dollars did not damn her.

Doherty’s book can never quite decide if the Institute offers a model for an aristocracy of the spirit — those remarkable women — or else for a humbler reconciliation of art to daily life, one with genuine democratic purchase. She suggests this contradiction in addressing at least one critique redolent not of midcentury luxury but of 1930s barricades. The fierier spirit of the WPA turned one fellow, writer Tillie Olsen, somewhat against the polite ethos of Radcliffe: “Olsen imagined a time when everyone would have access to art and culture and everyone would have a chance at producing the same,” Doherty sings. The Institute, as Olsen found it, was part of the “strange breadline system” of artist grants and fellowships that was all too likely to miss “some mute inglorious Jane Austen.” She delivered these observations at an Institute talk entitled “Death of the Creative Process” in 1963. Sexton apparently enjoyed the riffing and asked to copy her friend’s notes. “In times of struggle, perhaps Sexton turned to the transcript, read a few lines, and gathered her strength to write again,” imagines Doherty — Marxist lecture as incongruous tonic.

Unlike either Olsen or Walker, who composed “In Search of Our Mothers’ Gardens” (sometimes read as a retort to second-wave matrophobia) during her fellowship, Doherty does not understand her avowed feminist and egalitarian ideals to be in appreciable conflict with the elite venue. (Radcliffe boasted an admission rate under ten percent.) Eliding such tensions, she reaches for a unifying lowest common denominator: that material support of some kind — state or private, no matter — is good for female artists and “female community.” In practice, the political argument on offer amounts to presenting ideals of the Radcliffe Institute, adding splashes of more progressive elements embodied by Olsen and Walker, throwing in a ritual appeal to state-sponsored childcare on the last page, and shaking. With so little attention paid to the dynamics of actual politics, the concoction can leave the reader woozy. One could be forgiven for picturing The Wing, but outfitted with a democratic-socialist credo and AOC on the walls. 

Why not, in fact, think of the Institute and its network as merely an elegant piece of social engineering — an island for elites within a larger island for elites, even with the resident Marxist soliloquizing for a couple of hours — rather than a proto-feminist flashpoint? Bunting, indeed, was not so much a seer of democratic vistas as a planner of society on a minor scale, who wished to transform the habits and practices of American women — positing that “studying, in appropriate doses, mixes wonderfully well with homemaking.” 

Beyond Radcliffe’s walls, it was a time of ferment in the realm of family life — an era marked by LBJ’s Head Start program, one of the Great Society initiatives for childcare centers, and by the rise of non-institutional daycare groups formed among feminist mothers and fathers. The Gay Liberation Front’s child-rearing proposals lay just around the corner in the 1970s. Weighed against such energies, the work that the Institute did for its cohorts of mothers can seem tame. 

Walks by the Charles River, poetry workshops conducted over the phone, typewriters by the poolside — these scenes Doherty renders more attentively than the politics of the era. Sexton and Olsen could finally admit, for instance, that they admired poets Sara Teasdale and Edna St. Vincent Millay, deemed “minor” by male critics. Doherty also ably captures a mood of domestic ambivalence, not stylizing these women as anti-conformist firebrands. For the most part, they weren’t. “I could try out lines in my head while doing the dishes or hanging the laundry… or conveying a child to a music lesson or the dentist,” remembered Kumin. At the time, this was not a statement to be met with reflexive scorn, and Doherty is generally sensitive to that neutral could, to avoid reading it as an enraged had to, as it would have been formulated in later feminist manifestos, ones with charming chapter titles like Firestone’s “Down with Childhood.”

Other readings, however, are more strained. The Equivalent friend-group’s tradition of picnicking and sharing meals — or as Doherty puts it, taking “responsibility for feeding the others and their children” — did, to be sure, ease “the domestic burden” of guests. But this is also typically called hosting and can be a very pleasant and fun thing to do. When Robert Lowell — then married to the brilliant Elizabeth Hardwick, and admiring of Elizabeth Bishop above any other — calls a young poet, Carolyn Kizer, a “beautiful girl,” perhaps, it should not be summarily written off as “misogyny.” Patronizing, sure! But unmentioned in Equivalents, Sexton reported back to Kizer that Lowell liked her poem and seconds Lowell’s assessment: “now there are several more people who know C.K. is a lovely creature.” Doherty writes about the daisy-chain of poems and lithographs passing between Sexton and Swan as the fruit of a radically “collaborative relationship,” “based more on sound than sense,” “an exogamous love.” One hesitates to point out that there is nothing inherently feminist about ekphrasis.

Feminist or not, these collaborations were short-lived. Doherty notes that the Equivalents represented a “fleeting window of women’s camaraderie and autonomy,” chalking up their disbanding to inevitable geographic dispersal: “schedules failed to line up, visits were missed, there were more weeks between letters.” But more than just home addresses changed. When Kumin had to act as Sexton’s “friend and nurse, her critic and her caretaker,” Doherty does not mince words: “Someone who assumes completely the mantle of caretaker cannot also be a true friend.” Kumin was slighted too by Olsen, who refused to blurb Kumin’s book and offered no response to the proofs. Meanwhile, Sexton commissioned Barbara Swan to draw a cover for her collection Live or Die (1966), which won the Pulitzer Prize in 1967. And as a 1973 Pulitzer judge herself, Sexton convinced the committee to give Kumin the award. (Kumin would go on to name her New Hampshire farm “PoBiz [poetry business] Farm.”) How did this “female community” come to operate so much like the exclusive networks that not long before shut out “lady poets”? 

It may be one trouble with such sentimental bonds formed in sisterly solidarity against oppressive domestic restraint — they are only as strong as the oppression that elicits them. Absent its effects, we may find only the ordinary vices. Critics of the time, fighting for other forms of social justice, were attentive to this unlucky dialectic. In 1962, Hannah Arendt wrote a letter to James Baldwin about a strain of unbidden sentimentalism she detected in his New Yorker essay “Letter from a Region in My Mind,” which she otherwise admired. “In politics, love is a stranger,” she wrote, “and when it intrudes upon it nothing is being achieved except hypocrisy.” With Arendt’s admonition in mind, Baldwin would later admit to sentimentalizing politics in his description of his old Harlem neighbors:

“Hannah Arendt told me the virtues I described in the New Yorker piece — the sensuality I was talking about, and the warmth, and the fish fries, and all that — are typical of all oppressed people. And they don’t, unluckily, she said — and I think she’s entirely right — survive even five minutes the end of their oppression.”

It is unlucky. Friendship is not always, or not merely, a staging-ground for a coherent feminist politics. Still women sometimes hoped for a way of life that was strange to the exclusionary networks around them. As Sexton wrote in the same unquoted letter to Carolyn Kizer: “There is such a slight, small band of lady poets with guts that it is impossible not to want to draw closer and form a band of understanding although we all play different notes on our own horns.” We might hear in that expectation powerful criticism and affirmation, and not merely the sound of an age’s hapless captives. 

But by the 1970s, the Equivalents were no longer a “slight, small band.” They were the Poetry Biz. Even back in the early ’60s Sexton recognized the Institute for what it was: in her words, a “status symbol.” Why the wide-eyed admiration for a status symbol today? Is this really the story of our aspirational future — of institutional largesse and time and art and big inspirations and petty resentments, somehow for all? 

Has it not yet been five minutes? 

 

Historians had once thought so. In the 1960s and 1970s, scholars like Carroll Smith-Rosenberg, Ann Douglas, Nancy Cott, and even Christopher Lasch performed high-wire acts, deftly balancing between the double void of archival oblivion and sentimental admiration. Erotically-charged epistolary exchanges, Boston marriages, and all sorts of sentimental affection among middle-class white women came within their nimble handling, which never resorted to genteel moralizing. That is to say, there is nothing new about stories of female friendships among the well-off and well-educated in history. But before the rise of the female friend, never had the topic been lacquered over with a lusterless coat of chartreuse.

In Harper’s, a reviewer recently ventured that the gussied-up subgenre suggests “that the classic cradle-to-grave treatment applied to men is not always appropriate for women’s narratives: not because they aren’t interesting enough to deserve it, but because it can’t adequately represent the profound and inextricable networks in which women work and live.” This is impressively foolish. The truth is that cultural or intellectual history often takes the form of a group biography, from histories of Viennese aesthetes and antimodern elites, to New York bohemians, anti-philosophical philosophers, the new breed of radical intellectuals, and doomed Victorian couples. But these particular books justify themselves beyond their particular schema of categorization by staking out what is utterly lacking in the new industry output: ideas. As such, maybe it is understandable that a critic could conclude that there is just something more social about the “social sex” — that, alas, the female artist is the female friend. 

This is all the more dismal a takeaway when the female friend challenges so little today. Particularly in the cultural realm, she fits too well into a system of exclusive social alliances that allocate professional perks to the lucky, well-connected handful. Networks — female or otherwise — are the alpha and omega of the writing industry, and of the endlessly whirring reputational mills on social media. Friendship networks earn you prizes; they protect your book from being negatively reviewed; they knock off professional competition. One publisher’s winter 2021 fiction catalog best summarizes the phenomenon, plugging a new book so: “Author is extremely well-connected…. [W]e expect plenty of coverage considering [the author’s] profile and media connections.” Forget whether or not this writer happens to be talented.

Missing from the female friend trope is any coherent account of power outside the friendship — that is, other than the power of female friendship to uplift and the countervailing power of boorish men to tyrannize. But contending with the displacement of women from the modernist tradition is not so simple. Answering that trickier question would require more than what a history written under the sign of the female friend can deliver — at least in these glib incarnations. Among other preliminaries, it might require asking why Emma Bovary spends her days reading such sappy books.

The Land Was Ours

Northern Nevada, not far from the Oregon border, is a vast steppe, where rolling hills and basins stretch on for hundreds of miles beneath sagebrush and other shrubs that can endure the cold winters and dry summers. Beneath the surface are deposits of minerals, the sort that make our phones glow and electric cars run. It is one of the darkest regions — with the lowest levels of light pollution — in the Lower 48. In the final weeks of President Trump’s administration, as his rantings and calls to insurrection consumed the nation’s attention, his agencies were rushing to ensure that a mining company had all the proper permits needed to dig an open pit lithium mine, which will be one of the largest in the world. In all likelihood, the mine’s lifespan will exceed 40 years, and there’s little the incoming Biden administration will be able to do about it. 

Handing over natural resources to private interests was a consistent preoccupation of the Trump administration, from its first weeks to its final days. Less than a week before President Biden took office, the Trump administration approved a deal that will transfer several thousand acres of Arizona forest — an area sacred to the local San Carlos Apache Tribe — to one of the largest copper mining companies in the world. By the time the company is done, the area will be a crater two miles wide and a thousand feet deep. And between the November election and Biden’s inauguration, hundreds of thousands of acres of land in Colorado, Wyoming, California, and Alaska were auctioned to oil and gas firms at an unprecedented rate.

In each of these cases, the land in question is held by the American public and managed by the federal government — public lands, in other words. Public lands are one of the United States’s largest experiments in public ownership, of resources held in common, of something resembling a socialist practice. In 2016, one of Ronald Reagan’s advisors called public lands “a huge socialist anomaly in America’s capitalist system.” But under federal oversight, the lands are often treated as public in name only. The history of public lands, meanwhile, is one of broken treaties, colonial domination, and suppressed sovereignty.

It might be useful, here, to give some sense of scale. The federal government controls some 640 million acres of public land, the majority of which falls under the purview of the Department of the Interior (DOI). The rest is largely national forest managed by the Forest Service, which is part of the Department of Agriculture, an odd division that only makes sense if trees are understood as a commodity crop. The DOI is a federal agency whose mission is so broad, its responsibilities so numerous, that it’s easy to lose sight of its importance. Within the Interior Department is a jumble of sub-agencies and bureaus that build dams and reservoirs, supervise national parks and wildlife refuges, clean up abandoned coal mines, and oversee the building of new ones. Several of the DOI’s offices engage directly with the nearly 600 federally recognized Native American tribes. It’s the arm of the federal government with the most direct and substantial impact on the lives of Indigenous people. 

But the Interior Department is best understood as a resource manager. It oversees more than 20 percent of the entire United States. Much of that land — which is concentrated in the Western U.S. — is, in turn, governed by an office within the DOI called the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), whose offices and staffers dot the intermountain West, building hiking trails, fighting wildfires, and leasing rangeland for cattle grazing. And that’s just on the surface. Beneath the ground and offshore, along the Outer Continental Shelf that hugs America’s coastline, lie nearly two billion acres that contain vast deposits of coal and minerals, as well as reservoirs of natural gas and oil. This makes the Interior Department one of the largest supervisors of fossil fuel resources on the planet. The Interior Department fills federal and state coffers by leasing land for oil and gas drilling and mining. Energy produced on public lands accounts for a quarter of national carbon emissions, according to a United States Geological Survey report from 2018. “The Interior Department’s influence on this country’s response to the climate crisis is almost impossible to overstate,” notes a recent article in The Nation, which correctly points to the DOI as the crucial agency for implementing a Green New Deal.

For most of their existence, the agencies that oversee public lands and resources have operated under conflicting charges. The BLM is supposed to use its resources to generate revenue while conserving those same resources “for the use and enjoyment of present and future generations.” Both the revenue creation and the conservation are done in the name of the public. In its historical practice, though, the agency’s interpretation of this charge has meant ceding natural resources to private logging, ranching, mining, and drilling interests at low — and sometimes no — cost. Previous administrations courted private interests, but the level of corporate capture under the Trump administration has been extreme, according to Mark Squillace, a professor of natural resource law at University of Colorado Boulder. The Trump administration was “singularly focused on private interest,” he said.

Restoration of rolled back policies and repair of broken oversight have been early Biden administration priorities. But there is much more to be done, and Biden’s Interior Secretary nominee — Rep. Deb Haaland from New Mexico’s 1st Congressional District — is a promising pick for enacting real change in the management of public lands. Haaland’s appointment is significant, and not only because as a member of the Pueblo of Laguna, she would be the first-ever Native American Cabinet Secretary. When water protectors blocked the Dakota Access pipeline in 2016, Haaland showed up at the protest camp and cooked meals. In a Congress packed with multi-millionaires, she makes monthly student loan payments. Haaland is a co-sponsor of Green New Deal and Medicare for All bills.

Beyond new personnel and policy changes, what’s needed is a new understanding of publicly owned resources. Depending on where you live, public lands might seem like an abstraction or a concrete part of everyday life. In my rural Colorado county, 83 percent of the land is publicly held. Some of my neighbors clear brush and plant trees on federal land. Others take deer every fall to fill their freezers, or cut firewood in the national forest to warm their houses in winter. Most of us walk on the trails and camp in the woods. But whether you interact with public lands every day or never see them is somewhat beside the point. Every American citizen has a stake in public lands — as trustees of their mineral wealth and potential, as beneficiaries of their unjust founding, and as citizens responsible for their future.

 

The history of American public land management is largely one of privatization. The Interior Department was founded in 1849 and was instrumental in surveying and distributing colonized land as settlers pushed across the Great Plains and into the Western U.S. This process was codified by the Homestead Act of 1862. In practice, the law facilitated a massive transfer of wealth into private hands; the Interior Department provided more than 245 million acres of expropriated Indigenous land to farmers and ranchers. “‘Public land’ for ‘public good’ was a highly subsidized federal endeavor for private enterprise, racial exclusion and Indigenous elimination,” writes Nick Estes, a member of the Lower Brule Sioux Tribe and an American studies professor at the University of New Mexico, in Our History is the Future, a recent account of the resistance to the Dakota Access pipeline at Standing Rock. Today, according to Estes, a quarter of U.S. adults are descendants of direct beneficiaries of the Homestead Act. 

The General Mining Act of 1872 was another tool of settlement by privatization. The law was blunt: simply finding a deposit of valuable minerals established the right to dig a mine — finders keepers, in other words. The land could then be “patented,” or signed over to private ownership for, at most, $5 per acre. There’s been a moratorium on patenting since 1994, but substantial aspects of the 1872 law are still in force today, giving private companies extreme influence over federal resource decisions. Companies that mine hardrock minerals — the most valuable metals, including gold, silver, copper, and lithium — pay no taxes on their estimated hundreds of billions of dollars in profits, and haven’t for more than a century. Until the 1970s, mining companies were not even required to clean up their operations once the minerals had been extracted, leaving the public on the hook for tens of billions of dollars in reclamation costs. Every day, a 2019 Associated Press investigation found, more than 50 million gallons of toxic water leaks out of abandoned mineral mines.

There’s a long-running joke that the acronym “BLM” stands for the “Bureau of Livestock and Mining.” Created in 1946 to regulate Western rangelands, which were being overgrazed by cattle companies, the BLM did not do much regulating at first, instead shuffling off duties to local grazing advisory boards. Change came in the 1970s, with the rise of the modern environmental movement. Congress passed several landmark laws: the National Environmental Policy Act, the Clean Water and Clean Air Acts, the Federal Land Policy and Management Act. These laws codified a new environmental consciousness and social understanding of public land as a public trust that ought to serve the common good, thus moderating the influence of extraction industries. 

Predictably, perhaps, there was a backlash. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, a loose coalition of Western politicians at all levels of government — along with many ranchers, miners, and logging companies — challenged federal oversight of public land in what became known as the Sagebrush Rebellion. “Count me in as a rebel,” Ronald Reagan declared at a 1980 campaign stop in Salt Lake City; his administration would roll back environmental and land use regulations at the urging of corporate interests. 

Today, the federal government does not simply hand over land to private companies. Instead, it auctions it off at regular lease sales. Companies or individuals indicate to the BLM which parcels of land they are interested in and buy leases in 10-year terms. The more competitive leases can go for $100 per acre, but some sell “at non-competitive” rates as low as $1.50. Over the past four years, Trump’s political appointees made the approval process even easier by weakening federal laws requiring environmental impact studies and public input.

From 2003 to 2019, nearly 90 million acres of federal land were auctioned off — nearly half at non-competitive rates. Millions of acres are currently hoarded by energy companies, which will hold onto the leases and hope for better markets — while claiming these public resources as financial assets to beef up their balance sheets. Even if they are not drilling, the companies retain rights to the land, which sits there, untended and unused. Regardless of what the company does with its lease, the land remains notionally public, as does the oil, trapped under hundreds of feet of soil and rock. But if the company finds oil and decides to drill, the mineral resources become de facto private. The company cuts a road and builds a fence. It puts in a drilling pad and rig and sinks a borehole deep underground. Leasing sales have gone on every few months, every year, for your entire life. In principle, we have a say in what happens to these lands and what is done, or not done, with the oil and gas they contain. But it doesn’t feel that way, does it? 

 

Federal land management isn’t always the most exciting topic, between the cloud of legal jargon and maze of policies that seem designed to depress public attention. Under President Trump, the DOI was subject to increased scrutiny, in part because of sheer brazen generosity to industry, but also because of the people appointed to positions of power. Trump’s first Interior Department Secretary was Ryan Zinke, a former congressman from Montana. On his first day, he rode a horse to work through the streets of Washington, D.C., and, a few months later, he travelled in a private jet owned by oil and gas executives. Zinke insisted that DOI staff hoist a special flag whenever he was in the agency headquarters — an act of self-aggrandizement more fitting for the Pope than a federal bureaucrat. A remarkably diverse list of ethics violations — including a shady real estate deal with a Halliburton executive, a censored climate report, and multiple taxpayer-funded vacations and Hatch Act violations — would ultimately force him from the job, but he accomplished quite a bit in a short tenure. One of his first actions was to lift a moratorium on new coal mines, along with cuts to dozens of environmental protections. In 2018, Zinke opened up nearly all waters along the U.S. coastline to oil and gas sales, a move Trump would repeal two months before the 2020 election, likely in a bid to win states like Florida and North Carolina.

And then, there were the monuments. In late 2017, after some lobbying by uranium mining companies and Western Republicans, and with Zinke’s backing, Trump made massive cuts to two national monuments in southeastern Utah: Bears Ears, which contains an extraordinary concentration of sites sacred to the Navajo, Hopi, Ute, and other tribes, and Grand Staircase-Escalante, with its redrock plateaus and snaking canyons. The monuments were reduced by a combined two million acres, the largest one-time removal of federal land protections ever. 

Overwhelmed by ethics investigations, Zinke resigned after two years and was replaced by David Bernhardt, a career D.C. lobbyist for oil and gas companies. Bernhardt’s industry ties were so numerous that, at Interior, he notoriously carried around a small card that listed all his conflicts of interest. With less fanfare, Bernhardt picked up where Zinke left off, easing restraints on oil and gas drilling, cutting regulations, pushing career agency staff out the door, and, during the pandemic, approving the removal of federally mandated taxes for oil and gas drillers on public land. 

This last move, according to Squillace, is particularly representative: the Trump administration pushed oil and gas development, whether or not it made any economic sense. The tax cut was implemented during a global oil glut caused by Covid-19. Oil prices were crashing. But once it became clear that Trump had lost re-election, his administration began approving oil and gas leases at a faster rate than ever before, the Associated Press found, as corporations made a final frenzied rush to hoard drilling rights. “The Trump administration treated public lands like gifts to give away to their favored corporate industries,” Squillace said. 

But while Trump promised that his administration would establish “energy dominance,” it was his predecessor who secured it. Over the course of President Obama’s eight years in office, the country experienced its largest-ever oil boom. By the end of his second term, America was the most prolific petroleum producer on the planet. Obama has tried to take credit, holding up the increase next to the Paris Climate Accord as evidence of his Third Way credentials. “That was me, people,” he said in 2018, of the oil boom. This boast is not entirely truthful. Production increased largely due to technological advances in fracking, which allowed drillers to bore not just down, but sideways, opening up new oilfields in Texas, Pennsylvania, and North Dakota. In late 2015, Obama signed a repeal of a 40-year-old ban on exporting crude oil; two years later, the U.S. became a net oil exporter for the first time in decades. Most oil production took place on private land, but Obama’s Interior Department offered up more acres of public land for drilling each year than Trump’s, on average. 

Unlike Trump’s lease sales, Obama’s took place while oil prices were high, so they generated more revenue for the government. The Interior Department is under constant pressure to sell land from Western states because half of the taxes from public land extraction goes to the state in which the extraction occurs. That money pays for schools, hospitals, parks, and roads. A single, record-breaking 2018 oil and gas lease sale in southeastern New Mexico allowed the state to increase education spending by half a billion dollars the next fiscal year. (In fact, before the pandemic tanked oil prices, New Mexico’s governor had proposed statewide free public college, funded mostly by oil and gas taxes.) Over half of Wyoming’s annual revenue comes from energy extraction, including on public lands. Now that oil, gas, and coal prices have plummeted, the state is proposing brutal cuts to public services across the board, with spending reductions to state health services and education. With many state budgets dependent on mining and drilling, moving away from carbon-based fuels is more urgent than ever. At the same time, energy-dependent economies desperately need stable sources of income. This is a dilemma that the Biden administration will face. 

 

Many of the regulations cut by the Trump administration can be restored with a stroke of the presidential pen — indeed, Biden is already beginning to make such reversals. Wednesday, in what someone dubbed, bluntly, “Climate Day,” he signed a slew of executive orders including a moratorium on all new public land oil and gas lease sales. His nominee for Interior Secretary, Deb Haaland, has voiced her support for a total ban on federal mineral leasing: no new oil, gas and coal sales. As head of the agency, Haaland could also help enact vital conservation plans, install stringent caps on public land drilling emissions, promote renewable energy, and create jobs via the new Climate Conservation Corps.

Haaland could also force the agency to consult in good faith with tribal governments when land use decisions will impact them. Tribal consultation is a legally mandated process, but the Interior Department too often does a cursory job, when not neglecting the process entirely. A former tribal administrator herself, Haaland regularly criticized these shortcomings in Congress, and she could break new ground as head of the DOI. In recent years, the push to return stolen land to Indigenous tribes has gained momentum. The “land back” movement is a matter of justice, but often, it’s also good environmental policy. In recent years, federal land has been returned to tribes in Oregon, in Northern California, and along the Klamath River, which the Yurok Tribe recently won a court battle to grant the legal rights of a person. 

Once confirmed, Haaland will have broad authority over new oil, gas, and coal leases. But new leases are the easy part. Existing leases — for active wells and mines — are the heart of the public land emissions problem. Then there are more than 20 million acres of already leased public land, onshore and off, not being used for drilling, but where companies hold the right to drill if and when they see a profit. These existing leases will be a persistent challenge to real climate action. (One of Biden’s first-day actions was to order a review of — and moratorium on activity for — Alaskan drilling leases sold in a controversial, last-minute auction by the Trump administration.) Leases are contracts between the government and corporations, and undoing them would be legally complicated. In a recent paper, the Environmental Law Institute proposed one way the Interior Department might go about this: by reconceiving its legal mandate, which calls for resource management that “will best meet the present and future needs of the American people.” This directive has long been understood to include fossil fuel extraction, but it need not, the paper argues — not when “the future” includes the climate crisis.

Haaland is on record supporting a ban on fracking, which puts her at odds with Biden and Vice President Kamala Harris. Haaland hails from New Mexico, where there’s a great deal of fracking. The impacts — roads packed with trucks, dirty groundwater, air polluted with fumes and chemicals — often afflict the state’s reservations and poorest communities. But banning the practice outright will be complicated. The vast majority of hydraulic fracturing takes place on private land, where the federal government cannot ban the practice without congressional legislation, not to mention a willing White House. But even if Biden refuses to attempt to ban fracking, his administration could at least refrain from bailing it out. 

This is the dirty little secret of the fracking industry: it has never been profitable. Not at the outset, not during the boom when Obama was president, and certainly not now, post-pandemic. Fracked wells are extremely productive at first, but production rates decline fast, often by more than half in the first year. Since the beginning, fracking companies have promised that technological advances would solve the production decline problem. They never have, which means that fracking companies drill new wells almost constantly, often near impoverished communities, which requires significant financial capital. A sort of ancestor to the WeWork fiasco, the fracking industry convinced Wall Street investors, hedge funds, and venture capitalists that if they kept pouring in money, profits would soon come out of the ground. They never did, and, given the post-pandemic oil downturn, it’s likely they never will. Still, last spring, the Federal Treasury purchased billions of dollars of corporate energy bonds, buying back years of bad debt accumulated by oil and gas companies, many of which engage in fracking. This was on top of the long list of tax write-offs, loopholes, and subsidies that oil and gas drillers can count on every year. In the next stimulus package, when the oil and gas industry extends its hand, the federal government need not help it up.

As for public land protections, Biden announced an Interior Department review of the reduced Bear Ears and Grand Staircase-Escalante monument boundaries. In all likelihood, this process will result in a restoration of the original monuments, as well as a rejection of the legality of Trump’s proclamation to shrink the boundaries in the first place. (Before Trump, the Antiquities Act of 1906 was read as granting the president a one-way authority to create monuments, not the ability to unmake or shrink them.) But Biden — and Haaland, upon her confirmation — can do much more.

Tribes that have called southeastern Utah home for centuries fought the reduction of both monuments. Bears Ears, in particular, is of profound cultural and historic value: the area contains more than 100,000 cultural and archeological sites. Today, a majority of local residents are Native people. The monument was the culmination of years of careful planning by the local tribes — Ute Mountain Ute Tribe, Navajo Nation, Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah Ouray, Hopi Nation, and Zuni Tribe — in what’s known as the Bears Ears inter-tribal coalition. They drafted proposals for protecting the land, created relationships with Obama administration officials, and built local support for the monument. The coalition consulted on the monument’s creation, which was widely praised in 2016. But their role was advisory, and the Obama administration only moved to create the monument at the “last second,” after Trump’s 2016 win, said Natalie Landreth, an attorney for the Native American Rights Fund, which represented the Hopi, Zuni, and Ute Mountain Ute tribes in a lawsuit against the Trump administration. In February 2020, before Biden’s nomination, Landreth told me she tries to disabuse people of the assumption that a Democratic administration would automatically fix things. “It was such a heavy lift to get the Obama administration to move on this,” she said.

In Biden’s Tribal Nation plan, he pledges to “provide tribes with a greater role in the care and management of public lands that are of cultural significance to Tribal Nations.” A good place to start would be giving the inter-tribal coalition the co-management authority laid out in the original monument proposal, which proposes that the coalition work with the federal government “as equals to make joint decisions.”

 

Disputes about American identity and civic belonging have always marked land as a site of conquest and oppression, contest and division. Our poets capture it best. Robert Frost once proclaimed, “The land was ours before we were the land’s.” As Julia Alvarez retorted: “The land was never ours, nor we the land’s / no, not in Selma, with the hose turned on / nor in the valley picking alien vines.”

In his address to the nation on November 7th, Biden said that we are called on to reckon with our nation’s past of racial hierarchy and domination. Such a reckoning would require a reconsideration of what we mean when we call federal lands “public.” “Discussions of the commons,” writes San Diego State University professor April Anson in a 2019 paper, “often still assume a public that is, in fact, particular to white settler subjects.” Today, public land officials rarely consult the descendants of the original inhabitants. Meanwhile, environmental groups too often operate with a narrow definition of the “public,” obscuring not only tribal governments, but anyone who does not fit the image of the well-off, Patagonia-clad, often white person who uses federal lands for recreation. 

And yet, we still use that word — “public” — to talk about federally held land, apparently holding out hope that these resources might be cared for outside the demands of the market. Accounting for the dark history and flawed present of American public land will require new forms of political imagination, and the first step is recognizing the magnitude of the crime — the original dispossession and genocide of Indigenous peoples. This point should not be passed over lightly. Americans are current beneficiaries of this historical wrongdoing: in tax revenue and hiking trails, in the fuel in our cars and the precious metals in our phones. And American citizens are responsible for how these lands and resources are used — the government claims to manage them for our collective good. 

In his 2019 book, This Land is Our Land, Jedidiah Purdy presents the concept of a “commonwealth” as “a community where no one gets their living by degrading someone else, nor by degrading the health of the land or the larger living world.” This idea might be useful. It might help us rethink our relationship to public lands and to each other. It might help us reframe the ordinary conversations about public lands, which tend to focus on their beauty, on their important ecosystems, on their utility, how they are rife with resources to exact, game to hunt, trails to use. But suppose we refer to public lands not as a collection of resources, but as a commons. For Purdy, a commonwealth names an ideal. In a commonwealth, many things are held in common and cared for by the people who make it up. The commonwealth idea concerns degradation of the land and degradation of people; repairing one requires repairing both. “No story or picture of the world matters much,” Purdy writes, “if it floats too far from what people do with one another’s bodies and with soil and weapons and other tools.” 

Will we ever achieve a commonwealth? Probably not, but that’s not the point. The commonwealth ideal provides an imaginative tool for thinking about how we proceed. Subsequent steps are not always clear, but the commonwealth ideal does direct us to reparative work regarding common goods, broken political relationships, and distribution of resources. It suggests some concrete actions — like fully implementing the inter-tribal coalition’s Bears Ears proposal, or supporting, when possible, the return of land to tribal ownership. These steps can’t set things right. But they can acknowledge that a great wrong has been done.

In his book on the Standing Rock protests, Nick Estes situates the resistance to the Dakota Access pipeline in a centuries-old tradition of tribal resistance in the central plains. In this tradition, he contrasts its rightly-ordered relationships between people, society, and the land with capitalist notions of ownership and exploitation. “How can settler society, which possesses no fundamental ethical relationship to the land or its original people, imagine a future premised on justice?” There’s no simple answer, Estes writes, possibly no positive answer at all, not in America as it stands today. But it’s not hard to read the histories of resistance and mutual support that Estes describes as real-world illustrations of the commonwealth ideal. Such examples provide possibilities to strive for — where people do not dominate resources, the land, or one another.